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ASSESSING THE COMPATIBILITY OF TITLE IX
AND § 1983: A POST-ABRAMS FRAMEWORK FOR

PREEMPTION
DeboraA. Hoehne*
INTRODUCTION

Sexual harassment of students by fellow students and by the teachers
entrusted with their education is a pervasive national problem. 1 In more
egregious cases, students, fearing confrontation and reprisal, may respond
2
to such harassment by transferring schools and by seeking legal recourse.
Although victims of sexual harassment can file a civil suit to remedy their
harassment, their legal recourse may be limited. The Sea Clammers
doctrine of statutory preemption curtails the potential claims by students
3
who experience sexual harassment.
Consider the story of Nicole Delgado, a music student at Western Illinois
University, who was subjected to the verbal and physical advances of her
voice teacher, James Stegall. 4 Although Ms. Delgado told another teacher

* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professors Tracy Higgins and Danielle Citron for their excellent guidance, and Professor
Sheila Foster for her invaluable insight. I would also like to thank my parents, John and
Margherita Hoehne, my husband, Jeffrey Feldman, my sister, Francesca Hoehne, and my inlaws, Beth and Sidney Feldman, for their love and support.
1. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998) ("The number
of reported cases involving sexual harassment of students in schools confirms that
harassment unfortunately is an all too common aspect of the educational experience.");
National
Women's
Law Center,
Sexual
Harassment,
http://www.titleix.info/
content.jsp?contentKEY=l90&t-sexual harassment.dwt (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
According to the National Women's Law Center ("NWLC"), eighty percent of students will
be subject to unwelcome sexual behavior during their educational experience, with twentyfive percent subject to continuing harassment. Id.; see Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, Drawing
the Line: Sexual Harassment on Campus 14 (2005) (stating that two-thirds of college
students report being sexually harassed); Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, Harassment-Free
Hallways:
How to Stop Sexual Harassment in School 9 (2004), available at
http://www.aauw.org/ef/harass/pdf/completeguide.pdf (stating that "four out of five [eighththrough eleventh-grade public school] students . . . said they had experienced sexual
harassment at some point during their school lives, with one-third reporting they experienced
it often" and that adverse effects included avoiding school, cutting classes, lack of attention,
and diminished class participation).
2. See, e.g., Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998).
3. See infra Part I.B.2.
4. See Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that Title IX
claims foreclosed § 1983 claims against a state university that lacked actual knowledge of a
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and a counselor about the harassment, neither educator reported the conduct
to the University's administration. 5 Despite evidence that Stegall had made
advances to at least four other female students during his tenure at Western
Illinois, only one student filed a complaint against him in the ten years
before Stegall's harassment of Ms. Delgado. 6 Based on this history, the
University's administration claimed it had no actual notice of Stegall's
7
harassment of Ms. Delgado.
Ms. Delgado, after transferring to another college, filed suit against
Western Illinois University and Stegall under Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 19728 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9 The United States
courts of appeals currently disagree on how Ms. Delgado's claims should
proceed. Some courts would hold that her claim against Stegall under
§ 1983 is preempted by her Title IX claim. Other courts would allow her to
pursue both claims.' 0 The U.S. Supreme Court has had occasion to review
the disagreement but has not spoken directly to the issue.I1
What does this mean for plaintiffs? First, Title IX's preemption of relief
under § 1983 can undermine the efforts of students like Nicole Delgado to
obtain relief and bring about change. Unlike under § 1983, plaintiffs
pursuing Title IX claims must show "actual knowledge" and "deliberate
indifference" on the part of institutions before such institutions can be held
liable. 12 By contrast, § 1983 generally requires plaintiffs to show
supervisory officials' gross negligence. 13
teacher's misconduct but did not foreclose § 1983 claim against a teacher for sexual
harassment).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 670-71.
7. Id. at 671.
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
Section 1983 plaintiffs can assert their federal
constitutional and most federal statutory rights, excluding rights protected by 42 U.S.C. §
1981 and statutes that either provide no private right of action or that provide their own
comprehensive remedies. See I Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation § 1.05, at 1-25
(4th ed. 2005); infra Part I.B.
10. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit allowed Ms. Delgado to proceed
with her § 1983 claim against Stegall in his individual capacity but preempted her claims
against Western Illinois officials under § 1983. Delgado, 367 F.3d at 674-75; see also infra
Part 11.B.2.
11. See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 377 F.3d 504 (6th Cir.
2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 1973 (2005) (mem.); see also infra Part II.B.5.
12. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (holding that
students could not obtain money damages from school districts for their teachers' sexually
harassing or abusive conduct unless the students showed that an "appropriate person" with
actual knowledge of the harassment and with the ability to take corrective action was
deliberately indifferent to that knowledge).
13. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Elizabeth J. Norman, Civil Rights Law and Practice 98
(2d ed. 2004) (stating that in cases involving certain constitutional violations, like
deprivations of due process, plaintiffs must show defendant's recklessness or gross
negligence); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) (holding that a
deputy sheriffs negligence in leaving a pillow on a stairway and causing an inmate
unintended iniury did not deprive the inmate of his liberty interest to be free from bodily
injury "without due process of law" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
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Unless defendant Stegall was known as a serial harasser,' 4 Western
Illinois would not have had actual knowledge of the harassment sufficient
to satisfy the first prong of the Supreme Court standard for institutional
liability under Title IX. 15
To satisfy the deliberate indifference
requirement, defendant Stegall's harassment would need to be notorious
such that university officials knew about the risk6 he posed and recklessly
failed to prevent his harassment of Ms. Delgado.2
Second, preemption would limit the potential defendants in lawsuits like
Nicole Delgado's. The Supreme Court noted in Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education17 that Title IX suits can only be brought against
institutions, not individuals.1 8 Section 1983 suits, on the other hand, can be
brought against individual state actors. 19 Defendant Stegall indeed was a
Process Clause). This standard varies somewhat among courts. See, e.g., Flores v. Morgan
Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that where an equal
protection violation was asserted, the court "agree[d] with . . . other circuits that have
considered similar issues that the plaintiffs must show either that the defendants intentionally
discriminated or acted with deliberate indifference"); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881,
914 (1st Cir. 1988) (requiring a showing of "gross negligence amounting to deliberate
indifference" to establish § 1983 liability for an equal protection violation).
14. See Delgado, 367 F.3d at 672. The Delgado court points out that the U.S. Supreme
Court requires knowledge of "acts of sexual harassment" rather than specific acts directed at
the plaintiff. Id.(citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641 (1999)).
15. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
16. Delgado, 367 F.3d at 671.
Judge Richard Posner notes that "[d]eliberate
indifference means shutting one's eyes to a risk one knows about but would prefer to
ignore." Id. This corresponds to "recklessness" which is the "equivalent of intentionality."
Id.; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
17. 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (finding that student-on-student sexual harassment may
constitute discrimination prohibited by Title IX where the funding recipient's deliberate
indifference to severe and offensive harassment deprives a student of meaningful access to
education and where the recipient has control over both the harasser and the circumstances in
which the harassment occurs).
18. Id.at 640-41 ("The Government's enforcement power may only be exercised against
the funding recipient ....
).
19. A defendant in a § 1983 action acts under color of state law where he or she "ha[s]
exercised power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."' West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49
(1988) (citation omitted). State officials who cause a deprivation of a federal right can be
sued for damages in their personal capacity, subject to a qualified immunity defense. See
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 31 (1991). To overcome a state actor's qualified immunity
defense, a plaintiff must show that the state actor knew or reasonably should have known
that he or she was violating a plaintiffs clearly established constitutional or statutory rights.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that in a § 1983 suit for
damages based upon their unconstitutional official acts, government officials performing
"discretionary functions" within the scope of their authority enjoy qualified immunity
"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known"); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987) (easing standards and procedures for defending on the ground of qualified
immunity). In Delgado, Western Illinois may have been insulated from suit in federal court
under § 1983 on sovereign immunity grounds. See Loeffler v. Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 36 F.
Supp. 2d 1058, 1058 (N.D. 111.1999) (mem.); see also U.S. Const. amend. XI. Sovereign
immunity extends to state agents and agencies that are "arm[s] of the state." Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430-31 (1997). "[N]onconsenting States may not be
sued by private individuals in federal court." Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
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state actor who "used his position to discriminate against her on the basis of
her sex, in violation of her federally protected rights to equal protection of
the laws." 20 Ms. Delgado, however, could not prove that the conduct of her
teacher, defendant Stegall, amounted to a policy or practice by her school
that would allow her to recover from Western Illinois under Title IX. 2 1 Ms.
Delgado's only recourse was to sue defendant Stegall in his individual
capacity under § 1983. If Title IX preempts such suits, Ms. Delgado would
be left without a remedy for Stegall's sexual harassment. 22 Such a result is
unjust and contravenes Congress's intent in adopting Title IX.
This Note examines whether plaintiffs who experience sex discrimination
in the education context can concurrently assert claims under Title IX and
§ 1983. Part I of this Note describes Title IX and § 1983. It discusses ways
in which the Supreme Court has curtailed civil rights litigation: its
retrenchment in the area of rights of action under § 1983 and its holdings on
preemption of § 1983 relief. In particular, the discussion of preemption
law 23 highlights City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California v. Abrams,24 the
Court's most recent clarification of when federal statutes preempt claims
under § 1983.25
Part II briefly introduces the disagreement among the federal courts of
appeals as to whether Title IX should preempt relief under § 1983. In
addition, Part II explains the circuit courts' arguments for and against Title
IX preemption of § 1983 actions. This part also explores how the Abrams
opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, and the concurrences, written by

U.S. 356, 363 (2001). For a discussion of sovereign immunity, the Fourteenth Amendment,
and Title IX, see Melanie Hochberg, Note, Protecting Students Against Peer Sexual
Harassment: Congress's ConstitutionalPowers to Pass Title IX, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 235
(1999) (arguing that Congress enacted Title IX pursuant to both its Spending Clause and
Fourteenth Amendment powers). However, municipalities and their officials and employees
may be liable under § 1983 for deprivations of rights guaranteed under federal law. See
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that there is no
respondeat superior liability under § 1983). The term "municipality" is generally thought to
include school districts and boards. See David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously:
Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73
Fordham L. Rev. 2183, 2186 n. 11 (2005). Claimants who allege that a local educational
institution, or its supervisory officials acting in their official capacity, violated the Federal
Constitution must show that an official policy or practice, such as a failure to act that would
amount to an official policy of inaction, was the "moving force" behind the claimant's
injury. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Other
sources of municipal liability include custom-based liability, a failure to train or supervise
theory, and a hiring-based theory of liability. See Achtenberg, supra, at 2188-89. See
Williams ex rel. Hart v. Paint Valley Local School District, 400 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2005), for
sample jury instructions in a suit involving claims brought under Title IX and § 1983.
20. Delgado, 367 F.3d at 673.
21. Id.at 674.
22. Id. at 674-75.
23. See infra Part I.B.2.
24. 125 S.Ct. 1453 (2005).
25. See infra notes 123-43. Abrams held that by creating the specific and very
circumscribed remedies contained in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA"),
Congress intended to supplant a § 1983 remedy. 125 S.Ct. at 1463.
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Justices Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul Stevens, support each side of the
circuit split.
Part III concludes that Abrams leads to preemption of § 1983 actions for
statutory and possibly also constitutional claims against institutions.
Abrams does not support preemption of constitutional claims against
individuals, the approach adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. However, in light of the dispute among circuits
concerning the preemption of relief under § 1983 and the heightened
liability standards under Title IX, many sexual harassment and sex
discrimination plaintiffs are left without a meaningful remedy. Thus, Part
III argues that amendment of Title IX will best solve this statutory
interpretation problem and restore Title IX's compatibility with § 1983 in
sex discrimination suits.
I.BACKGROUND

This part describes the background and scope of Title IX and then
provides an overview of § 1983 and two issues surrounding civil rights
litigation under § 1983: rights of action enforceable under § 1983 and
preemption.
A. Overview of Title IX
Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 26 The enforcement section of Title IX authorizes all federal
aid-awarding agencies to promulgate regulations that ensure recipient
institutions comply with Title IX. 27 So long as some of an institution's
funding emanates from a federal source, that institution must abide by Title
IX. 2 8 Institutions that discriminate on the basis of sex risk losing their
29
federal funds.

26. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). There are eight exceptions to this coverage. See id.§

1681 (a)(2)-(9). One commentator argues that these "exceptions codif[ied] Congress' belief
that gender-based distinctions, unlike racial distinctions, are desirable and appropriate in
certain circumstances." Allison Herren Lee, Title IX, Equal Protection, and the Richter
Scale: Will VMI's Vibrations Topple Single-Sex Education, 7 Tex J. Women & L. 37, 68
(1997).

27. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
28. Id.; see Bradford C. Mank, Are Anti-Retaliation Regulations in Title VI or Title IX
Enforceable in a Private Right of Action: Does Sandoval or Sullivan Control This
Question?, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. 47, 60 (2004) (noting that Title IX "applies to virtually all
public and private educational institutions, and includes all institutional operations such as

academic programs or athletics").
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1682. In practice, no institution has had its federal funding terminated
for noncompliance with Title IX. See Linda Jean Carpenter & R. Vivian Acosta, Title IX 24
(2005).
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1. Title IX's Legislative History

Congress enacted Title IX at a time when issues concerning sex
discrimination

gained national recognition. 30

In enacting

Title IX,

31
Congress sought to encourage equal treatment of the sexes in education.

The solution Congress designed to discourage sex discrimination was to

eliminate funding for educational institutions that support discriminatory

practices. 32 The floor debate comments of Senator Birch Bayh33 and
Representative Patsy Mink 34 reflected these goals. 35 Representative Mink
stated that "' [m]illions of women pay taxes into the Federal treasury and...
resent that these funds should be used for the support of institutions [that]
den[y] equal access"' 36 to women, while Senator Bayh commented that

"'[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive measure which.., is needed...
to provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and

training for later careers.'

37

Senator Bayh first introduced Title IX as a floor amendment in 1971, but
this 1971 version of Title IX was defeated and reintroduced in 1972.38
Congress rejected an alternate proposal that would have erected a more
general ban against the distribution of federal monies to educational

institutions engaging in discrimination on the basis of sex in favor of the
current version of Title IX, which created a civil right to be free from sex
39
discrimination.

30. Carpenter & Acosta, supra note 29, at 3.
31. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 n.36 (1979) (quoting 118 Cong. Rec.
5802, 5806-07 (1972) (comment of Sen. Bayh)). Title IX was patterned after Title VI,
which prohibits all recipients of federal funding from discriminating on the basis of race,
color, or national origin. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VI § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)
(2000). Title IX was intended to fill in a "perceived gap created by Title VI and Title VII,"
which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex and other protected
classifications because "neither law prohibited sex discrimination in the academic
environment." David S. Cohen, Limiting Gebser: InstitutionalLiabilityfor Non-Harassment
Sex DiscriminationUnder Title IX, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 311, 317-18 (2004) (arguing that
the Gebser standard of actual notice and deliberate indifference should not be applied to
Title IX non-harassment claims because sexual harassment was not a recognized legal theory
at Title IX's drafting whereas non-harassment claims were central to Title IX's prohibitions).
32. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
33. Senator Bayh was the principal drafter of Title IX. Mank, supra note 28, at 60.
34. Representative Mink coauthored Title IX and played a leading role in the passage of
Title IX.
See Feminist Majority Foundation, US Representative Patsy Mink Will be
Remembered as a Feminist Champion and Benefactor for Women, Feminist Daily
Newswire, Sept. 30, 2002, http://feminist.org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=7024.
35. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
36. Id. at n.36 (quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 39,248, 39,252 (1971)).
37. Id.(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5802, 5806-07 (1972)).
38. The second version was entitled "Title IX-Prohibition of Sex Discrimination." See
Cohen, supra note 31, at 318.
39. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693 n.14. Several senators objected to the fact that the
alternate bill did not expressly authorize a private remedy for victims of discrimination. Id.
This indicates that at least some of Title IX's drafters anticipated the statute would be
privately enforced.
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2. Scope of Title IX
The Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"), a division of the Department of
Education, 40 enforces Title IX. 4 1 The Title IX regulations promulgated by
the OCR 4 2 provide three avenues of enforcement: utilizing a school or
university's internal procedures, 43 filing an administrative complaint with
the OCR,44 or litigating either through private means or through suits

40. At the time Title IX was drafted, the Department of Education ("DOE") was the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"). See Carpenter & Acosta, supra
note 29, at 31 n.3. This name change did not significantly affect the statute. Id.
41. The Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") receives some criticism from commentators
who argue that it is less effective than it could be in enforcing Title IX's mandate. See Joan
E. Schaffner, Approaching the New Millennium with Mixed Blessings for Harassed Gay
Students, 22 Harv. Women's L.J. 159, 166 (1999) ("[R]ather than wield its own authority
and administratively enforce its own standards that hold schools vicariously liable for
harassment on their campuses, the OCR acquiesces by following court precedent in circuits
where that precedent is in conflict with its own policies."); see also Julie A. Klusas, Note,
ProvidingStudents with the Protection They Deserve: Amending the Office of Civil Rights'
Guidance or Title IX to Protect Students from PeerSexual Harassmentin Schools, 8 Tex. F.
on C.L. & C.R. 91 (2003) (arguing that the OCR provides conflicting legal standards for
peer sexual harassment that result in over-disciplining and under-protecting of students, and
advocating amendment of OCR harassment guidance or alternatively amendment of Title IX
liability standards applicable to private suits for money damages).
42. After conducting hearings, debates, and receiving comments from a wide range of
groups, the OCR presented its draft regulations for Title LX to Congress on June 18, 1974.
Carpenter & Acosta, supra note 29, at 5-6. The regulations were approved on July 21, 1975.
Id. at 6.
43. The OCR furnishes guidelines that provide schools with information about standards
of liability for Title IX violations and in-house procedures to follow to remedy such
violations.
See
OCR,
Overview
of
the
Agency,
http://www.ed.gov/about/officeslist/ocr/aboutocr.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2006). However,
the in-house complaint is the least effective method for enforcing Title IX. Carpenter &
Acosta, supra note 29, at 21.
44. The OCR was intended to be an "inexpensive, efficient, and effective" way of
remedying Title IX violations. See Sudha Setty, Note, Leveling the Playing Field:
Reforming the Office for Civil Rights to Achieve Better Title IX Enforcement, 32 Colum. J.L.
& Soc. Probs. 331, 332-33 (1999) (suggesting specific OCR reforms that would improve
institutions' compliance with Title IX). The OCR has jurisdiction to investigate Title IX
complaints where the allegation of sex discrimination is made against an educational
institution receiving federal funds. See Carpenter & Acosta, supra note 29, at 22. "The
person or organization filing the complaint need not be a victim of the alleged
discrimination, but may complain on behalf of another person or group." OCR, supra note
43. There is no fee to file an administrative complaint with the OCR. See Setty, supra, at
332. The OCR visits educational institutions that have received valid complaints,
independently assesses the situation, and assists the educational institution in formulating a
compliance plan. See id. at 332-33. Title IX requires that the OCR allow institutions to
voluntarily cure the violations before terminating funds. See id. Victims of sex
discrimination cannot receive compensation from OCR administrative proceedings. See Beth
B. Burke, Note, To Preclude or Not to Preclude?: Section 1983 Claims Surviving Title IX's
Onslaught, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 1487, 1495 (2000) (arguing that Title IX should preclude
statutory claims based on Title IX itself because Title IX's remedial scheme is
comprehensive, but also stating that Title IX should not preclude constitutional claims under
§ 1983).
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brought by the Department of Justice under the authority of the Attorney
45
General.
Title IX includes remedies other than the termination of funds to
educational institutions by federal agencies. In 1979, the Supreme Court
ruled in Cannon v. University of Chicago that Title IX supports an implied
right of action for aggrieved individuals. 4 6 Although Title IX's purpose
was "generally served by the statutory procedure for the termination of
federal financial support," the Court determined that Congress also "wanted
to provide individual citizens [with] effective protection against those
practices." 4 7 For the Court, terminating federal funds could not serve this
purpose because it was too severe a penalty and would be an "inefficient
48
and cumbersome" means to address isolated reports of discrimination.
The Court held that an "award of individual relief to a private litigant who
has prosecuted her own suit is not only sensible but is also fully consistent

45. See Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981), reprintedin 42 U.S.C. 200d-1
note (2000); see also Carpenter & Acosta, supra note 29, at 21. There are competing
considerations when choosing between filing an administrative complaint and initiating a
private lawsuit. OCR personnel do not act as zealous advocates for equity; "zealousness of
an OCR investigation depends largely on the administrative climate of a particular regional
OCR office or the commitment of the specific OCR employees assigned." Id. at 22. In
addition, Title IX complainants are amici curiae to administrative proceedings, rather than
parties, while Title IX recipients participate directly in any investigation and are afforded
due process protection in administrative hearings. Mank, supra note 28, at 61. If, after a
hearing, OCR finds an institution not in compliance with Title IX, the agency must send a
written report to the congressional committee with jurisdiction over the discriminatory
program and wait thirty days. Id. at 62. In the end, OCR usually enters into a settlement with
the funding recipient to prevent future discrimination. Id
Therefore, with these
considerations in mind, students with the necessary resources may choose to bypass these
administrative procedures in favor of a private lawsuit.
46. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 695-98 (1979). To establish a prima
facie case of sexual discrimination under Title IX, "a plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she
was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination in
an educational program; (2) that the program receives federal assistance; and (3) that the
exclusion from the program was on the basis of sex." Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232
(10th Cir. 1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000). Some lower
courts have also allowed suits based on the regulations promulgated pursuant to Title IX that
prohibit facially neutral policies with a discriminatory impact on one sex. See Lewis &
Norman, supra note 13, at 322. However, Alexander v. Sandoval called into question the
future of disparate impact suits based on enforcement regulations. Id.; see infra note 84 and
accompanying text; see also Jonathan M.H. Short, "Something of a Sport:" The Effect of
Sandoval on Title IX DisparateImpact DiscriminationSuits, 9 Win. & Mary J. Women & L.
119 (2002) (analyzing the impact of Sandoval on Title IX disparate impact litigation); cf
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1506-07 (2005) (finding coach's suit
based on Title IX and a regulation prohibiting retaliation for reporting Title IX violations did
not conflict with Sandoval because retaliation was prohibited by the statute's text, and thus
the Court did not need to rely on the regulation at all).
47. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704-05.
48. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious
Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 755, 791
(1999); see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705.
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with-and
in some cases even necessary to-the orderly enforcement of the
49
statute."

The Court later clarified, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,
that plaintiffs could seek monetary damages for intentional violations of
Title IX 50 but limited such damages to situations where an institution had
"actual notice" of sexual harassment and displayed "deliberate indifference"
to the tortious conduct of its employees. 5 1 Although Title IX is most often

49. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705-06. The Cannon Court also cited comments during the
debate of Title IX that indicated members of Congress foresaw termination of funding would
be rare because alternative remedies like lawsuits would prove to be a preferable and more
effective remedy to end discrimination. Id. at 705 n.38. The Court also gave weight to the
opinion of the DOE (then known as HEW), which submitted a brief arguing that
administrative enforcement was not always feasible and thus private enforcement was
necessary to ensure that sex discrimination was eliminated in federally funded education
programs. Id. at 708 n.42. Finally, the Court also looked to the background assumptions
drawn from Congress's experience with Title VI as supporting the availability of private
suits under Title IX. Specifically, the Court noted that with respect to Title VI, after which
Title X was patterned, "a judicial remedy---either through the kind of broad construction of
state action under § 1983 ... or through an implied remedy-would be available to private
litigants" regardless of whether or not federal funds were terminated. Id. at 711-12.
50. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 69, 76 (1992)
(recognizing an implied right of action against a school district under Title IX for failure to
prevent a teacher's sexual harassment of a student and finding that a damages remedy is
available for private suits brought to enforce Title IX). But see Lewis & Norman, supra note
13, at 318, 329 (citing Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185-86, 190 n.4 (2002) (finding that
punitive damages are not available for violations of Title VI, § 202 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but declining to address whether the
holding extended to Title IX because the issue was not reviewed by the courts below))
(suggesting that punitive damages may not be available because of the quasi-contractual
nature of Spending Clause legislation like Title IX).
51. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-93 (1998). The Court
noted that Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause authority and thus
the contractual nature of the relationship between the federal government and the funding
recipient required that a plaintiff allege that an "appropriate person" received notice and had
the opportunity to remedy any Title IX violation. Id. at 287. Although the Court did not
define who is an "appropriate person" that must receive actual notice of the violation, it is
clear that liability is not based on respondeat superior. See id at 290. Instead, the plaintiff
must show wrongdoing on the part of the institution itself. See id The Supreme Court
subsequently applied the same standard to hostile environment claims involving student-onstudent sexual harassment where the school exercises substantial control over the harasser
and the circumstances in which the harassment occurs, and where the harassment is so
pervasive, severe, and offensive that it deprives the student of a meaningful educational
opportunity. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999). In Davis,
the Court defined "deliberate indifference" as where a school official's behavior was "clearly
unreasonable" under the circumstances. Id. at 648. Although Gebser and Davis involved
Title IX liability standards for institutions for the sexual harassment of students, one
commentator argues that the Supreme Court left open whether this standard of institutional
liability applies to non-harassment sex discrimination claims. See Cohen, supra note 31, at
335-36. This commentator points out that, in cases involving non-harassment claims, lower
courts have applied either the standards articulated by Gebser or by Title VII
antidiscrimination law. Id. at 336. One student commentator argues that the heightened
liability standard applies to both harassment and non-harassment violations because the
actual notice standard stems from the fact that Title IX is Spending Clause legislation, and
not because the cases involved harassment. See Klusas, supra note 41, at 102-03. The OCR,
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in the spotlight for disputes over equity in athletics programs, 52 litigation
under Title IX has also encompassed employment, admissions, single-sex
schools, prison education programs, sexual harassment, 53 and retaliation for
reporting incidents of sexual discrimination. 54 Sexual harassment and
equity in athletics nonetheless remain the most heavily litigated areas in
Title IX suits.
The Supreme Court further expanded the scope of Title IX's private right
of action by broadening its reading of sex discrimination in Jackson v.
Birmingham Board of Education.55 Emphasizing the far-reaching purpose
behind Congress's enactment of Title IX, the majority concluded that
retaliation against a person alleging sex discrimination in a federally funded
educational program is a form of intentional discrimination encompassed by
Title IX's private right of action because such retaliation constitutes
differential treatment "on the basis of sex." 56 The Jackson majority created
an intent-based test to determine what conduct constitutes sex
discrimination prohibited by Title IX. 57 Disputed conduct that is motivated
by "gender-based animus" 5 8 falls within Title [X's prohibition against sex
discrimination.

however, has muddied the waters by issuing a Revised Guidance preferencing constructive
notice over actual notice where Congress or the Supreme Court is silent. See id. at 101-03.
52. Courts categorize Title IX regulations concerning female student athletes as covering
"effective accommodation, which concerns the availability of participation opportunities,
and equal treatment, which includes scholarships as well as the other athletic benefits and
opportunities." Catherine Pieronek, Title IX Beyond Thirty: A Review of Recent
Developments, 30 J.C. & U.L. 75, 78 (2003) (summarizing recent developments in Title IX
case law concerning effective accommodation and equal treatment of female athletes, and
reviewing and analyzing the findings of President George W. Bush's 2002 Commission on
Opportunity in Athletics). Prospective student athletes can bring claims of ineffective
accommodation while current student athletes can bring suit for unequal treatment. Id.
53. Lee, supra note 26, at 58.
54. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
55. Id. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the opinion in the 5-4 decision, and was
joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen
G. Breyer.
56. Id at 1509-10. The majority was also persuaded by DOE regulations that prohibited
retaliation against persons reporting Title IX violations. Id. at 1510. Justice Clarence
Thomas dissented and was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin
Scalia and Anthony Kennedy. He wrote that a victim's sex should occupy a central role in
determining whether the allegedly discriminatory behavior constitutes sex discrimination.
See id. at 1510-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also found no indication in Title
IX's text that Congress intended to create a private remedy for retaliation. See id. at 1514-16.
57. Id. at 1504 (noting that retaliation was "an intentional response to the nature of the
complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination").
58. Leading Cases, Retaliation as Sex Discrimination, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 357, 365
(2005).
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3. Congress and the Courts: Interpretation of Title IX
Congress can amend a statute to overcome what it deems an erroneous
interpretation by the Supreme Court. 59 The amendment procedure provides
60
Congress with an opportunity to clarify or to emphasize its original intent.
61
With those goals in mind, Congress has twice amended Title IX, and
made § 1988 applicable to Title IX plaintiffs, 62 to remedy judicial
interpretations it found inconsistent with Title IX.
In its amendments to Title IX, Congress addressed-and abrogatedjudicial interpretations it found undermined Title IX. Responding to preCannon circuit court rulings that victims of sex discrimination had no
private right to sue under Title IX, Congress allowed courts, in their
discretion, to award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties in Title
X suits. 63 Congress, following Cannon, also extended Title IX liability to
all institutional recipients of federal funds without regard to whether the
discriminatory program received federal funds. 64 Congress also abrogated
59. This strategic interaction between courts and Congress, where Congress may modify
a statute to correct what it deems an erroneous interpretation by courts, implicates separation
of powers concerns. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive
Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 28, 31 (1997). Some commentators
on this interaction draw on economic models of political behavior, such as game theory
analysis, to describe the competing considerations underlying a legislature's choice to
overturn a judicial decision. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the
Strategic Environment of Judicial Review, 1 Int'l J. Const. L. 446, 448 (2003). For a
discussion of how the Court's statutory interpretation affects the way Congress frames its
work, as well as how the judiciary responds to the threat of legislative sanction, see Georg
Vanberg, Legislative-JudicialRelations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional
Review, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 346 (2001).
60. See Klusas, supra note 41, at 105.
61. See infra notes 64-65.
62. See infra note 63.
63. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (CRAFAA), Pub. L. No. 94559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)). The CRAFAA
in turn supported the Cannon Court's reasoning that a private right of action would help
fulfill Title IX's promise of ending sex discrimination in educational institutions. Cannon v.
Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 685 n.6 (1979). The Court noted that Congress provided
attorneys fees for Title IX because, like other civil rights statutes dependant on private
enforcement, "'fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a
meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws
contain."' Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976)). The Court went on to discuss that
when the CRAFAA was enacted, many members of Congress assumed Title IX authorized
private suits and that private enforcement was even necessary to Title IX's enforcement. Id.
at 686 n.7.
64. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (CRRA), Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(1988) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000)); Burke, supra note 44, at 1496-97.
The Act reversed the part of the Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell that limited
Title IX's scope to the specific educational programs receiving federal funding rather than
the entire institution. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (holding that federal financial aid awarded directly
to students attending public college triggered Title IX regulation of the college); see also
NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 466 n.4 (1999) (acknowledging that Congress enacted the
CRRA to change the ruling in Grove City); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503
U.S. 60, 73 (1992) (same). Congress, overriding President Reagan's veto, mandated
institution-wide compliance with Title IX where any part of the institution received federal
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state immunity guaranteed under the Eleventh Amendment to federal fund
recipients under Title IX.6 5 This amendment ensured that plaintiffs could
recover monetary damages from a state in federal court for Title IX
violations.
Members of Congress recently proposed an amendment to Title IX that
would change the standard of liability for sexual harassment victims suing
under Title IX. The Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a
Stronger Society ("FAIRNESS") Act, also known as the Civil Rights Act of
2004,66 would have replaced the "actual knowledge" and "deliberate
indifference" requirements for sexual harassment plaintiffs under Title IX
with the constructive notice standard applicable to employers under Title
VII. 67 The FAIRNESS Act stalled in committees considering it in both
Houses during the session of the 108th Congress. 6 8 To date, its provisions
69
relating to Title IX have not been reintroduced during the 109th Congress.
Several commentators have endorsed the change in liability standards for
sexual harassment under Title IX set forth in the proposed FAIRNESS
70
Act.
funds. See S. Rep. No. 100-64, at 2 (1987) (declaring that Congress, in passing the CRRA,
"restor[ed] the effectiveness and vitality of the four major civil rights statutes that prohibit
discrimination in federally assisted programs"). However, only the particular program that is
not in compliance with Title IX will lose its federal funds. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000).
65. The Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act ("CRREA"), enacted as § 1003 of the
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C § 2000(d)(7) (2000), is applicable to
cases initiated by both the DOE and individual plaintiffs. See Kristen M. Galles, Filling the
Gaps: Women, Civil Rights, and Title IX, 31 Hum. Rts. 16, 17 (2004); Burke, supra note 44,
at 1496.
66. See Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil
Rights Act of 2004, S.2088, 108th Cong. §§ 101, 111-12 (2004); H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. §§
101, 111-14 (2004). The FAIRNESS Act was introduced in the House on February 11, 2004
by Representatives John Conyers (MI), John Lewis (GA), and George Miller (CA), 150
Cong. Rec. H514 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2004), and in the Senate on February 12, 2004 by
Senator Ted Kennedy (MA), 150 Cong. Rec. S1296 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2004) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy). See Dina Lassow, In Support of a New Civil Rights Act, 31 Hum. Rts. 22, 22
(2004).
67. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2004) ("With respect to conduct between fellow
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where
the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the
conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.").
68. See Bill Summary and Status for the 108th Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov (follow
"Bills, Resolutions" hyperlink, then follow "Search Bill Summary and Status" hyperlink, and
search for Bill Numbers "H.R. 3809" and "S.2088" in the 108th Congress). After a bill is
drafted and introduced, it must survive the committee to which it is referred. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., et al., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation 69 (2000). "[M]ost bills die in
committee." Id.at 70. Although outside the scope of this Note, there is a substantial body of
scholarship that addresses legislative deliberation under the rubric of public choice and
social choice theory. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, " Not an "It":
Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 239 (1992); Maxwell L.
Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L.J. 1219 (1994).
69. See Legislation in Current Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov (search for "Title IX"
under "Search Bill Text").
70. See Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 48, at 792-93 (arguing that, for Title IX, the
Court should adopt the employer liability standard applicable in Title VII cases because of
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B. Civil Rights Litigation Under § 1983
Section 198371 does not create substantive rights for civil rights
litigants. 72 Instead, it provides a means to redress the deprivation of
73
federally protected rights by persons acting under color of state law.
Section 1983 creates a remedy for a state actor's discrimination based on
constitutionally prohibited factors like race, gender, and religion. 74 An
individual acting under color of state law could be held liable for
deprivations of constitutional guarantees, such as the right to equal
protection 75 or due process 76 as well as for violations of statutory provisions
the nondelegable duty of schools to protect children from discrimination and the minimal
deterrence that actual notice would provide in the educational context); Cohen, supra note
31; Meghan E. Cherner-Ranfi, Comment, The Empty Promise of Title IX: Why Girls Need
Courts to Reconsider Liability Standards and Preemption in School Sexual Harassment
Cases, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1891 (2003) (arguing that Title IX does not provide adequate
relief for plaintiffs in sexual harassment and sex discrimination suits and thus should not
preclude suit under § 1983); Klusas, supra note 41, at 108 (noting that Congress could
institute a constructive notice standard and clearly state that "anyone who has control over
student discipline" can receive constructive notice).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
72. See Sheldon H. Nahmod et al., Constitutional Torts 2-3 (2d ed. 2004). Originally, §
1983 created a right to sue for constitutional violations only and did not reference federal
statutes. However, in 1874, Congress added "and laws" to the text of § 1983, and the
meaning of this addition has provoked much scholarly debate. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank,
Suing Under § 1983: The Future After Gonzaga University v. Doe, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1417,
1419-20 (2003) (arguing that "the Gonzaga decision places a heavy and unnecessary burden
of proof on plaintiffs by requiring unambiguous and explicit evidence that Congress intended
to create an individual right benefiting a class including the plaintiff'). Not all federal laws
create rights enforceable under § 1983. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)
(finding that plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating violations of enforceable federal
rights, not merely violations of federal law); see also infra Part I.B. 1.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 claims cannot be brought against private persons,
but they can be brought against entities acting under color of state law or individuals acting
in their official capacity and implementing an official policy, custom, or practice. See Monell
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that municipalities cannot
be sued on a respondeat superior theory but "can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,
declaratory, or injunctive relief where" the allegedly unconstitutional action "implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers"); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469
(1986) (holding that local government entities are responsible for the official policies and
acts of their employees with policymaking authority as determined by local laws, customs,
and usages).
74. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988) (finding that the central purpose of §
1983 is to provide a means for individuals whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are
violated to recover damages or equitable relief).
75. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o state
shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In the sexual harassment
context, the Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to guarantee a right to be free from
sex discrimination. In addition, plaintiffs also assert equal protection violations when an
institution fails "to investigate and address the plaintiffs complaints of sexual harassment."
Burke, supra note 44, at 1498 n.77. Gender classifications challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause receive intermediate scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (holding that "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, ... classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to ... those
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like those contained in Title IX. In practice, the Supreme Court limits the
77
federal laws that can be privately enforced under § 1983.
At the outset, a court must decide if a federal statute creates a right that is
presumptively enforceable through § 1983.78 Then, a court must determine
whether that statutory right can coexist with relief under § 1983 or if
Congress has expressly or implicitly rebutted the presumption of the
79
availability of a § 1983 remedy.
1. Rights Enforceable Under § 1983
In 1980 the Supreme Court first held that § 1983 could serve as a vehicle
to vindicate federal statutory rights. 80 The Court narrowed that mandate in
a subsequent series of cases that clarified the plaintiffs who could pursue
claims under § 1983.81 In Blessing v. Freestone,82 the Court emphasized

objectives"); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533 (1996) (holding that
"[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action," and that "[tihe burden ... is
demanding and it rests entirely on the State."). In athletic equity cases, where the equal
protection violation may involve allocation of athletic resources or scheduling of sporting
events based on gender classifications, the defendants must show that the impermissible
gender classifications serve a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., Cmtys. for Equity
v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 377 F.3d 504, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct.
1973 (2005).
76. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits states from "depriv[ing]
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. To show a procedural or substantive due process violation, plaintiffs must prove a
state actor knew or reasonably should have known his or her conduct clearly violated the
plaintiff's established constitutional right, and that the state actor deliberately deprived the
plaintiff of that right, or that supervisors acquiesced to that conduct. See, e.g., Murrell v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, Denver, Co., 186 F.3d 1238, 1249 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding a school deliberately
indifferent to a male student's sexual assault of a female special education student where a
janitor and teachers knew of the assault but the school failed to investigate the assault,
inform the police, or discipline the male student).
77. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
78. See id. at 297 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 85-87 and accompanying
text.
79. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 297 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1980).
81. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (holding that foster care children could
not bring a § 1983 action against the State of Illinois for violations of the Child Welfare
Act's ("CWA's") "reasonable efforts" provision because the provision did not create a
binding obligation on states). The Suter Court in dicta also raised the issue that the
alternative remedial scheme of terminating federal funds for states without a state plan that
conformed to the CWA's requirements might "manifest Congress' intent to foreclose
remedies under § 1983." Id. at 360. "[D]issatisfied with 'the Supreme Court's interpretation
in Suter of the scope of § 1983 and the effect it might have on enforcement of the Social
Security Act ("SSA")[,]' Congress in 1994 amended the federal [SSA] to essentially restore
the principles governing the enforcement of the [Act] that existed pre-Suter," namely a
private right of action to enforce through § 1983 obligations found in state plan requirements
under the SSA. 1 Schwartz, supra note 9, § 4.03, at 4-30; see 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)(2), (10)
(2000) (second alteration in original).
82. 520 U.S. 329, 348 (1997) (holding that the statute at issue did not foreclose relief
under § 1983 because it "contains no private remedy-either judicial or administrative-
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that a plaintiff seeking to enforce a federal statute under § 1983 must
demonstrate that a specific federal statutory provision creates an
enforceable right, not just that federal law has been violated. 83 Also, the
Court has curtailed private rights of action for disparate impact
discrimination claims, holding that "[t]he express provision of one method
of enforcing
a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude
84
others."
The most recent Supreme Court decision limiting the availability of
§ 1983 to enforce federal statutes is Gonzaga University v. Doe.85 In
Gonzaga, the Court held that if Congress wants to create a federal statutory
right, "it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms." 86 The Court
reasoned that § 1983 does not allow suits against state actors for violation
of every federal law, it only permits the enforcement of clearly articulated
"rights, not . . . broader or vaguer 'benefits' or 'interests."' 87
Underlying these rules is the Court's strong presumption against finding
implied private rights of action. Instead, plaintiffs must rely on a federal
statute's express enforcement mechanism, which is typically entrusted to
federal agencies, and which may not provide complete remedies in the form
of money damages or injunctive relief.88 Under such circumstances, 89a
§ 1983 claim may supplement the available remedy against state actors.
Professor Cass Sunstein has attributed the Supreme Court's limits on

through which aggrieved persons can seek redress" but rather relies on Executive Branch
oversight to ensure states' compliance).
83. See 1 Schwartz, supra note 9, § 4.03, at 4-32. The Court also stated that "a
plaintiffs ability to invoke § 1983 cannot be defeated simply by '[t]he availability of
administrative mechanisms to protect the plaintiff's interests."' Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347
(quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 498 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)).
84. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001) (holding that Title VI does not
contain an implied right of action for disparate impact claims).
85. 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (holding that Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974 ("FERPA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2000), does not create a privately enforceable right

to not have student records disclosed without written consent).
86. See id at 290. The Court pointed to Title VI and Title IX as statutes containing the

requisite rights-creating language. Id.at 284. The Court explained that the administrative
procedures established by FERPA, whereby individuals filed written complaints to be

reviewed and resolved by an appointed panel, supported the argument that Congress could
have intended to foreclose a private remedy. Id.at 289-90. Despite the comprehensive
individualized review system established by FERPA, "in the thirty years between FERPA's
adoption and Gonzaga, the [DOE] did not once withhold or terminate funding for a violation
of the Act." Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a
Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence,103 Colum. L. Rev. 1838, 1859 (2003).
87. Gonzaga, 563 U.S. at 283.
88. See Nahmod et al., supra note 72, at 234 ("The [federal] agency may... have a

limited range of enforcement tools at its disposal, such as cutting off federal funds. Absent
recourse to section 1983, individuals who are harmed by violations of such statutes may
have no way of obtaining a remedy.").
89. See Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of FederalLaw, 49
U. Chi. L. Rev. 394, 415 (1982).
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implied rights of action to the Court's belief that these issues merit
legislative action, not judicial policymaking. 90
2. Statutory Preemption of § 1983 Relief
Congress can override § 1983 with other federal statutes or specify that
"for some laws § 1983 is not available as an enforcement mechanism." 9 1 A
federal statute's comprehensive remedial scheme can also indicate that a
§ 1983 remedy would be incompatible with the federal statute's remedy
regime. 92 In that vein, the Court has held that Congress "implicitly"
93
foreclosed a private remedy under § 1983 in several instances.
a. The Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n 94 Doctrine
After announcing that § 1983 was available to plaintiffs to vindicate
violations of federal statutory rights, 95 the Court subsequently sought to
curtail states' liability under § 1983. In Sea Clammers, the Supreme Court
held that Congress need not be explicit to preclude relief under § 1983.96
The Court explained that Congress can manifest an intent to preempt
§ 1983 claims by creating a comprehensive enforcement mechanism within
the statute. 9 7 The plaintiffs in Sea Clammers sought injunctive and
declaratory relief, along with monetary damages from various state agencies
and state and federal officials, for the alleged discharge of pollutants in
violation of federal environmental statutes. 98 The Court sua sponte raised
90. Id. at 438-39; see also Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur

implied right of action cases reflec[t] a concern, grounded in separation of powers, that
Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of remedies for violations of
statutes." (internal quotation omitted)).
91. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 528 (3d ed. 1999).
92. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453 (2005); Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); see also Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 522 (1990)
(holding that the Medicaid Act's remedial scheme-withholding federal funds and
administrative review--did not manifest Congress's intent to preclude a private remedy);
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)
(holding that a federal statutory rent ceiling created rights enforceable under § 1983 and
noting that private enforcement is unavailable "where Congress has foreclosed such
enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself and where the statute did not create
enforceable rights, privileges, or inmnunities within the meaning of§ 1983").
93. See Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1458; Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009; Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at
20.
94. 453 U.S. 1.
95. See supra text accompanying note 80; infra note 99.
96. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 4-5. The plaintiffs invoked a broad array of legal theories, including the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (2000); the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1445 (2000); federal common law; the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000); the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§
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the issue of whether the plaintiffs could sue the state municipalities and
local sewerage boards under § 1983 for their alleged violation of federal
environmental laws. 99 Analyzing the plain language of the environmental
statutes, the judicial and administrative remedies available under them, and
the legislative history, the Court concluded that the environmental statutes
precluded § 1983 relief. 10 0 The Court explained that the "unusually
elaborate enforcement provisions" that allowed citizens and enforcement
agencies to bring suit to enforce the environmental statutes' provisions' 0 '
evinced congressional intent to preempt § 1983 claims. 10 2 The Court
reasoned that to allow suits under § 1983 would contravene the statutes'
03
extensive enforcement scheme. 1
Sea Clammers did not, however, resolve the question of what specifically
would constitute a sufficiently comprehensive enforcement scheme that
would preempt § 1983 claims. Professor Sunstein argues that the Sea
Clammers doctrine, given its lack of clarity, provides inadequate guidance
on the question of whether a federal statute's remedial scheme preempts
§ 1983 claims. 10 4 Professor Sunstein suggests an alternative approach: A
federal statute preempts a § 1983 remedy when (1) a federal statute
establishes an independent cause of action, either expressly or "justifiably"
implied by the words of the statute; 10 5 (2) open-ended standards govern
how an agency determines a statute's substantive reach;1 0 6 (3) consistency
or coordination is needed for a statute's enforcement; 10 7 or (4) the statute
08
favors informal enforcement methods, like negotiation, over litigation.'
4321,4331-4335 (2000); New York and New Jersey environmental statutes; the Fifth, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; 46 U.S.C. § 740; the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2672, 2674-2680 (2000); and state tort law. Id. at 5

n.6.
99. Id. at 19. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for the Court, noted that in the
previous term the Court had decided Maine v. Thiboutot, which construed § 1983 as
authorizing private suits for violations of federal statutory rights by state officials. Id.; see
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1980). Justice Powell dissented in Thiboutot, and
presumably sought an opportunity to curtail that holding. See id.at 22 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court's opinion does not consider the nature or scope of the litigation it
has authorized. In practical effect, today's decision means that state and local governments,
officers, and employees now may face liability whenever a person believes he has been
injured by the administration of any federal-state cooperative program, whether or not that
program is related to equal or civil rights." (footnote omitted)).
100. See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 19-21.
101. Id.at 13. The Environmental Protection Agency had a number of enforcement
options aside from civil suits, including compliance orders and criminal penalties. Id.
102. Id. at 20.
103. Id.
104. See Sunstein, supra note 89, at 427-38.
105. Id. at 427-28. Professor Sunstein cites as an example the citizen-suit provisions
created by the environmental statutes at issue in Sea Clammers. Id.
106. Id.at 428-30 (arguing that where statutes, like the Sherman Act, impose a
"reasonableness" standard for legal conduct, that finding falls within an agency's discretion
because of its "particular competence in assessing and weighing the relevant facts and
policies").

107. Id.at 430-32. Professor Sunstein writes that preemption is appropriate where it is
"relatively clear from the structure or history of the statute that Congress intended to
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One student commentator has argued that the Court's "remedial scheme"
approach inevitably leads to preclusion. 0 9 It is suggested that the analysis
should focus on rights rather than remedies. 110 Under this view, the
question of § 1983's preemption should turn on whether the statute
vindicates the same rights as § 1983.111 If the federal statute fails to
provide alternative relief that is akin to § 1983 relief, the statute should not
be interpreted to preclude § 1983 claims."12 This approach, the student
commentator observes, would honor § 1983's goal of broadening litigants'
access to federal courts to redress civil rights violations perpetrated by state
officials. "13
b. ConstitutionalProvisions in Conflict with Statutory Schemes: Smith v.
114
Robinson
The Supreme Court has also addressed congressional withdrawal of a
cause of action under § 1983 for constitutional violations. In Smith v.
Robinson, the Supreme Court "held that Congress has the power to exclude
particular constitutional claims from the scope of § 1983."115 The plaintiff
in Smith, a special education student suffering from cerebral palsy, asserted
violations of the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 116 section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Fourteenth Amendment's
7 The plaintiff's
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 11
statutory and
constitutional claims were based on the same set of facts. 118 The Smith
Court found that the EHA preempted the § 1983 litigation because
Congress intended the EHA to serve as an exclusive remedy for violations
of a child's right "to a free appropriate public education." ' 1 9 The Court
held that if the alleged constitutional violation is "virtually identical" to the
plaintiffs statutory right, and Congress intended that statute to serve as the
concentrate enforcement responsibilities in a particular institution" or "a rational
enforcement scheme requires the exercise of prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 43 1.
108. Id.at 434-35. For example, this occurs where there is a cooperative process between
a regulatory agency and a state. Id.at 435.
109. See Myron D. Rumeld, Note, Preclusion of Section 1983 Causes of Action by
Comprehensive Statutory Remedial Schemes, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1183,

1186 (1982)

(analyzing the comprehensiveness test for preempting § 1983 actions and concluding that
statutory § 1983 actions should be precluded only where the statutory remedial scheme
otherwise affords that plaintiff adequate relief).
110. See id.
at 1184-90.
111. See id.at 1203.

112. See id. at 1200, 1204-05.
113. See id. at 1201.

114. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
115. See 1 Schwartz, supra note 9, § 3.03, at 3-28.

116. The Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA")was renamed the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")in1990. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419 (2000).
117. Smith, 468 U.S. at 994-95. The Court noted that the plaintiff "made no effort to
enlarge the remedies available under the EHA" by asserting a § 1983 claim. Id. at 1004-05.
However, the Court signaled that it would have foreclosed such litigation. Id.at 1008 n. 11.
118. Id.at 1009.
119. Id.
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"exclusive avenue" for a plaintiff to obtain redress, the statutory remedy
subsumed the § 1983 claim for the alleged constitutional violation. 120 In
Smith, the plaintiffs constitutional claims were virtually identical to the
EHA claims, and the EHA's legislative history indicated Congress sought a
cooperative process for resolving disputes. 12 1 Therefore, the Court found
that allowing plaintiffs to pursue their constitutional claims under § 1983
rather than bringing them only under the EHA's carefully tailored
administrative review procedures would undermine Congress's judgment of
the best method to ensure states' compliance with their obligations to
22
educate handicapped children. 1
c. Revisiting the Rebuttable Presumption of Recourse to § 1983: City of
Rancho Palos Verdes, California v. Abrams 123
In 2005, the Supreme Court reconsidered the Sea Clammers doctrine and
further clarified the availability of § 1983 for violations of federal statutory
rights. Abrams involved the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA"),
which limits state and local governments in their regulation of wireless
communications facilities and gives plaintiffs a private cause of action for
violations of the statute. 124 The TCA also establishes remedies limiting
relief for plaintiffs in ways that § 1983 does not. 125
The Abrams Court addressed whether Congress intended for the TCA
remedy to coexist with an alternative remedy available under § 1983.126
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, identified two situations where § 1983
is unavailable to redress violations of federal statutory rights: (a) where the
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1011-13. Congress responded to the Supreme Court's decision in Smith by
enacting the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 ("HCPA"). See Pub. L. No. 99372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2000)). The HCPA
provides that IDEA does not limit an individual's right to pursue claims under other federal
statutes or provisions of the U.S. Constitution. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) ("Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available
under the Constitution .... "); 1 Schwartz, supra note 9, § 3.03, at 3-30. Therefore,
Congress made clear that IDEA does not restrict the assertion of constitutional claims under
§ 1983. See id. IDEA does, however, require plaintiffs to exhaust their state remedies before
filing a civil action under IDEA in federal court. See id Although Congress repudiated the
outcome in Smith, the underlying principle of Smith remains good law. Id. In other words,
Congress could withdraw recourse to § 1983 for particular constitutional claims. Id.
"Whether Congress has in fact exercised this power in a given instance is strictly a question
of congressional intent." Id.
123. 125 S.Ct. 1453 (2005).
124. Id. at 1455-56.
125. Id. at 1458-60. The TCA's enforcement mechanism mandated that judicial review
be sought within thirty days of a final decision and heard on an expedited basis, likely
excluded compensatory damages, and had no provision for reasonable attorney's fees and
costs. Id. at 1459-60. "A § 1983 action, by contrast, can be brought much later than thirty
days after the final action, and need not be heard and decided on an expedited basis." Id. at
1460 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the remedies available to successful § 1983 plaintiffs
include damages and reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Id.
126. Id.
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statute mandates more restrictive remedies than § 1983127 and (b) where the
statute contains private remedies that suggest congressional intent to
supplant § 1983 relief. 12 8 The Court held that even if a plaintiff has
demonstrated that a federal statute confers a private right of action on a
class of beneficiaries to which the plaintiff belongs, a defendant can rebut
the presumption that the plaintiff has a § 1983 claim. 129 This requires that
the defendant show that Congress intended to foreclose a "more expansive
remedy under § 1983" by enacting a sufficiently specific or comprehensive
federal statutory remedial scheme that logically implies Congress's intent
for the statutory remedy to be exclusive. 130 The Court found that the TCA
created a "complex and novel statutory scheme"'131 that "adds no remedies
to those available under § 1983, and limits relief in ways that § 1983 does
not." 132 Thus, the Court held that the statutory scheme of the TCA
133
preempted the plaintiffs § 1983 claims.
The Court reasoned that Congress's limitations of the remedies available
under the TCA reflect its deliberate decision to restrain remedial options for
TCA violations. 134 For the Court, such limitations cannot be "evaded
through § 1983.' 13 5 The Court distinguished past decisions that upheld
§ 1983 claims for federal statutory violations because in those cases the
federal statute failed to provide a private remedy-either judicially or
administratively. 136 The presence of private remedies under the TCA
undermined the propriety of upholding a § 1983 action based on the
TCA. 13 7 Furthermore, the Court in Abrams rejected Congress's inclusion
of a "saving clause" in the TCA that would have prevented the TCA's
comprehensive remedial scheme from affecting plaintiffs' ability to
vindicate under § 1983 rights in existence prior to the TCA's enactment.1 38
127. Id. at 1459 (noting the "more restrictive remedies provided in the violated statute
itself').
128. Id. ("Moreover, in all of the cases in which we have held that § 1983 is available for
violation of a federal statute, we have emphasized that the statute at issue, in contrast to
those in Sea Clammers and Smith, did not provide a private judicial remedy.").
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1458.
131. Id. at 1460.
132. Id. at 1459.
133. Id. at 1463.
134. Id. at 1459-60.
135. Id. at 1460.
136. Id. at 1459.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1461-62 (finding that denying enforcement of the TCA under § 1983 does not
"impair" the § 1983 remedy). The Court points out that the absence of a remedy, such as
attorney's fees, itself represents a congressional choice to exclude that remedy through other
federal statutes. Id. at 1460. But see Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497,
1505 (2005) (rejecting the argument that Congress could have expressly mentioned
retaliation as discrimination prohibited by Title IX, as it did when it enacted Title VII, and
that such an omission evinced congressional intent to foreclose a cause of action for such
conduct). At least one scholar would question preclusion in the face of a savings clause. See
Chemerinsky, supra note 91, at 528 ("It is curious to find an implicit preclusion of litigation
when there is an explicit provision preserving all other remedies.").
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The Abrams concurrences written by Justices Breyer and Stevens urged a
more cautious approach to the preemption of § 1983 claims. Justice
Breyer's concurrence 139 advocated an analysis that looks beyond a statute's
express remedies. 140 He emphasized the importance of evaluating the
context in which Congress adopted the federal statute, in addition to the text

of the statute itself, to determine whether Congress designed the statute to
constitute a comprehensive and exclusive remedial scheme.141
Justice Stevens's concurrence mirrored this approach. He wrote that
legislative history is essential to assessing whether a statute's

"comprehensive and exclusive remedial scheme" impliedly forecloses a

§ 1983 remedy.' 4 2 Justice Stevens would find that only in "exceptional
case[s]"-where the statutory scheme Congress established is "unusually
comprehensive and exclusive"-would a statute foreclose relief under
§ 1983.143
II. Is TITLE IX COMPATIBLE WITH § 1983? A POST-ABRAMS EVALUATION
OF THE DIVERGENT CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES

Title IX presents a particularly complex problem with respect to § 1983
preemption because the Supreme Court has found that Title IX's statutory
scheme includes an implied right of action, permitting a plaintiff to sue for
monetary damages in addition to--or instead of-equitable or declaratory
relief. As a result, the question for the purpose of § 1983 preemption turns
on whether this scheme, arguably including the judicially "found" implied
right of action, is sufficiently comprehensive to indicate Congress's intent
to preempt a § 1983 claim. The federal courts of appeals are split as to

whether Congress intended to foreclose a remedy under § 1983 for sex
44

discrimination. 1
With varying levels of analysis, the courts have followed three different
strategies in resolving the issue. On one hand, the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth

139. Justice Breyer's concurrence was joined by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and
Souter. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1462 (Breyer, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. Id; see also infra Part II.A.4.
142. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1463-64 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also infra Part II.A.4.
143. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1464 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also infra Part II.A.4.
144. Compare Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997), Lillard v. Shelby
County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996), and Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226
(10th Cir. 1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000), with Delgado v.
Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004), Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749
(2d Cir. 1998), Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir. 1993)
(vacating the district court's iudgment on a § 1983 claim concurrently litigated with a Title
IX claim because "the constitutional claims are 'subsumed' in [T]itle IX"), and Pfeiffer v.
Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 783, 789 (3d Cir. 1990) (refusing to hear a
§ 1983 claim in a case where a student brought claims against the school district, board, and
officials under Title LX and § 1983 for gender discrimination, and where the district court
held that the § 1983 claims were subsumed by Title IX, because the Sea Clammers doctrine
had been applied in analogous cases).
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Circuits have held that Title IX does not preempt § 1983 claims. 14 5 These
courts have found that Title IX's express remedies weigh against
14 6
Congress's intent to preempt § 1983 relief.
By contrast, the Second and Third Circuits, along with some district
courts, have held that Title IX preempts § 1983 claims. 147 These courts
have found that Title IX established a comprehensive remedial scheme that
evinced congressional intent to preempt all non-Title IX remedies.
Among courts that would generally find preemption, yet another
approach has identified circumstances in which certain § 1983 claims might
not be preempted. 148 For example, the Seventh Circuit has held that
preemption depends on the identity of the defendant and whether the § 1983
claim vindicates rights under Title IX or those asserted in the U.S.
Constitution. 149 Under that approach, Title IX would not preempt § 1983
claims asserting that state actors in their individual capacity committed
constitutional torts but would preempt § 1983 claims asserted against
educational institutions
and supervisory officials as well as § 1983 claims
0
based on Title IX.15

145. See Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1284; Lillard, 76 F.3d at 723-24; Seamons, 84 F.3d at

1234. District courts in the Fourth Circuit would also follow this approach. See Jennings v.
Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 240 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500-01 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (holding that
plaintiff's § 1983 claims were not subsumed by Title IX claims); Carroll K. v. Fayette
County Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (holding that Title IX does
not preempt suit under § 1983 when the underlying set of facts not only violates Title IX but
also violates independent constitutional rights).
146. See infra Part I1.A.
147. See Bruneau, 163 F.3d 749; Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d 779; see, e.g., Canty v. Old Rochester
Reg'l Sch. Dist., 54 F. Supp. 2d 66, 73-77 (D. Mass. 1999) (finding Title IX preempts claims
under § 1983 even though it does not provide a private right of action against individuals);
Nelson v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 914 F. Supp 643, 647-48 (D. Me. 1996) (finding that Title IX's
remedies preempt any constitutional or statutorily based claims asserted under § 1983); see
also infra Part II.B.
148. One student commentator has argued that lower courts have not properly
distinguished between statutorily and constitutionally based claims in their analysis of
whether Title IX should preempt relief under § 1983. See Michael. A. Zwibelman,
Comment, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1465,
1471-73 (1998) (arguing that Title IX precludes neither Title IX-based claims nor
constitutional claims brought under § 1983 because a judicial determination that a statute
creates an implied right of action compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
preclude § 1983 claims); see also infra Part II.A.2-3.
149. See Delgado, 367 F.3d at 672-73.
150. See Doe v. D'Agostino, 367 F. Supp. 2d 157, 170-71 (D. Mass. 2005) (following the
Seventh Circuit's approach and preempting constitutional claims against educational
institutions but not individuals when brought in the same lawsuit as Title IX claims); infra
Part 1I.B.4.
Compare Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999)
(dismissing a § 1983 claim against an institution based on a statutory claim for sex
discrimination because it was preempted by Title IX), and Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs.,
91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding Title IX preempts a constitutional claim brought under
§ 1983 against an institution), with Delgado, 367 F.3d at 669 (allowing a Title IX claim
against an institution and a § 1983 claim for an equal protection violation against a teacher).
However, the Second and Third Circuits do not recognize that constitutional claims fall
outside the preemptive reach of Title IX. See Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 757-58; Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d
at 789; see also infra Part II.B.3. The Second Circuit saw "nothing in Sea Clammers that
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This part examines the circuits' varying approaches to suits involving
Title IX and § 1983 claims and explores whether these courts' rationales
comport with the Supreme Court's decision in Abrams. Part II.A explores
the reasoning of courts that find Title IX does not preempt § 1983 claims.
Part II.B develops the rationale of those courts that find Title IX preempts
§ 1983 relief. Parts II.A.4 and II.B.5 analyze how the Supreme Court's
opinion and the concurring viewpoints about the compatibility of federal
statutes with enforcement under § 1983, as laid out in the Abrams decision,
frame the disagreement among the circuit courts on the preemption
question.
A. DecisionsFinding that Title IX Does Not Preempt Relief Under § 1983
This section outlines the reasoning of courts that have found that the
express remedies provided by Title IX are not comprehensive enough to
overcome the presumption of enforceability under § 1983 and that Title
IX's legislative history does not manifest an intent to preempt relief under
§ 1983. These courts have also declined to find that Title IX subsumes
constitutional claims, although one circuit
would not permit § 1983 claims
15 1
based on violations of Title IX itself.
1. Applying the Sea Clammers Doctrine to Express Remedies
Courts finding that Title IX does not preempt § 1983 claims have
considered the available remedies expressly provided by Title IX and found
that the implied private right of action is outside the relevant statutory
enforcement scheme.
In Crawford v. Davis,152 a student sued the
University of Central Arkansas and certain of its high-level officials under
Title IX and § 1983 for inadequately responding to her sexual harassment
complaints. 153 The Eighth Circuit found that Title IX did not provide a
sufficiently comprehensive remedy under the Sea Clammers doctrine and
thus did not preempt § 1983 claims. 154 The court reasoned that Title IX's
provision concerning the termination of federal funds failed to constitute an
"unusually elaborate enforcement provision."' 55 The court explained that
the absence of expressly authorized citizen suits and administrative
enforcement procedures, present in the environmental statutes in Sea
Clammers, illustrated that Congress did not design Title IX to preempt
other remedies. 156 The court further based its decision on the Supreme
would support a constitutional rights exception," even though the court declined to "address
the extent to which Title IX subsume[d] a § 1983 claim against the individual defendants" in
that case. Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 755, 757.

151. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234 n.8 (10th Cir. 1996), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000); infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1282.
Id at 1284.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
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Court's analysis of Title IX's legislative history in Cannon and Franklin
where the Court indicated that Title IX's statutory scheme is not exclusive,
57
and, as a result, identified an implied private damages remedy.,
The Tenth Circuit in Seamons v. Snow 158 similarly found that Title [X's
statutory scheme was not so comprehensive as to warrant preemption of
§ 1983 claims. Seamons involved a football player who reported a hazing
incident committed by his teammates to his coach. 159 His coach rebuked
the plaintiff for reporting the incident and asked the plaintiff to apologize to
his teammates for having done so.1 60 School officials never took action
against the perpetrators of the hazing incident, instead suggesting that the
plaintiff transfer to another school.' 6 1 The plaintiff alleged that his coach
fostered a hostile environment and that the school officials' response
constituted sex discrimination and harassment.16 2 The plaintiff sued under
Title IX and § 1983, alleging due process, equal protection, and First
63
Amendment violations.1
The Tenth Circuit, focusing on the sole express remedial provision in
Title IX (i.e., the termination of federal funds), observed that any private
right of action under Title IX was implied. 64 In the Tenth Circuit's view,
the express remedy could not support a finding of preemption. 165 The court
reasoned that nothing less than an express provision for a private right of
action could demonstrate congressional intent to supplant § 1983 suits for
166
constitutional torts.
157. Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992); Cannon
v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 683 (1979)).
158. 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir.

2000).
159. Id. at 1230.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. The court found that the hazing conduct to which the plaintiff was subjected did
not constitute sex discrimination because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the conduct
was "sexual" in nature or that the defendants would have acted differently in response to the
occurrence of a similar event in the women's athletic program. Id. at 1232-33. But see
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1507 (2005) (finding that Title IX's
protections, in contrast to other federal antidiscrimination laws, encompass discrimination on
the basis of sex, not "discrimination on the basis of such individual's sex" (internal quotation
omitted)).
163. Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1230.
164. Id. at 1233-34.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 1234. The Fifth Circuit has also, in dicta, agreed with the Tenth Circuit's
interpretation of Title IX's remedial measures. See Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir.
1995). In Lakoski, the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston denied tenure to a
female professor. Id. at 752. The professor brought a sex discrimination action against the
university under Title IX and under § 1983 for the alleged Title IX violation. Id. The court
declined to "say that Title IX provides a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to
indicate by itself that Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 suits based upon rights created
by Title IX." Id. at 755. However, the court went on to hold that plaintiffs seeking damages
for employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational programs
under Title IX "directly or derivatively through § 1983" are preempted by Title VII, which
provides the exclusive remedy for such discriminatory employment practices. Id. at 753,
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2. Independent Constitutional Claims Are Not "Virtually Identical"
Courts have also addressed the narrower issue of whether § 1983 actions
alleging equal protection or due process violations are preempted by Title
IX, even assuming that § 1983 claims based on Title IX itself are
preempted. The Eighth Circuit has found that Title IX does not preclude
constitutionally based § 1983 claims. 167 There, with respect to the
plaintiffs equal protection claim, the Eighth Circuit held that Title IX "in
no way restricts a plaintiffs ability to seek redress via § 1983 for the
violation of independently existing constitutional rights, even if the same
set of facts also gives rise to a cause of action [under Title IX]."'1 6 8
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Lillard v. Shelby County Board of
Education,169 held that Sea Clammers did not "stand for the proposition that
a federal statutory scheme can preempt independently existing
constitutional rights, which have contours distinct from the statutory
claim."' 170 Likewise, the court reasoned, Smith did not impede plaintiffs
from bringing constitutional claims independent of the Title IX claims
where there was "no legislative history indicating a congressional intention
to preclude reliance on section 1983 as a remedy."' 17 1 The Sixth Circuit
upheld the plaintiff's due process claim under § 1983, reasoning that a due
process action 172 did not assert remedies unavailable under Title IX but
instead sought to enforce distinct and independent federal constitutional
rights. 173 Therefore, the court ruled that Title IX does not preclude
constitutionally based § 1983 claims that are not "virtually identical" to
174
Title IX claims.
The Tenth Circuit in Seamons relied on the Sixth Circuit's reasoning that
Title IX does not supersede constitutional claims under § 1983.175 The
758. But see Zwibelman, supra note 148, at 1477 ("[T]he existence of other civil rights
statutes merely highlights the likelihood that discrimination remedies sometimes will
overlap.").
167. See Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997).
168. Id. For the same reasons, the Eighth Circuit also allowed a student to bring a due
process claim against her teacher-abuser for violation of the student's constitutional right to
bodily integrity. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999).
169. 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996).
170. Id. at 723.
171. Id.

172. Plaintiffs may want to assert procedural due process violations where they were
denied their right to a fair hearing. See Zwibelman, supra note 148, at 1479. In addition,
plaintiffs may want to assert substantive due process claims, such as deprivation of
education, privacy, or bodily integrity. See id.(noting that claims could be based on a
plaintiff's "liberty interest in bodily integrity under the substantive due process right in the
Fourteenth Amendment"). For the Supreme Court's discussion of the right to bodily
integrity, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) (holding that "unjustified
intrusions on personal security" by the state are "[a]mong the historic liberties" that the Due
Process Clause protects).
173. Lillard,76 F.3d at 723.

174. Id.
175. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff's due process
claims failed because the court found that there was no liberty or property interest to support
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Seamons court found that because Sea Clammers resolved only preemption
of § 1983 statutory claims, it was inapplicable to constitutional
for constitutional
violations. 176 Thus, plaintiffs suing under § 1983 177
violations do not circumvent Title IX's remedial scheme.
3. Statutorily Based Claims Are Allowed
The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit to definitively hold that Title IX
does not preempt § 1983 claims based on violations of Title IX.178 The
Sixth Circuit in Lillard stated in dicta that "even if the defendants'
argument had been directed at an attempt by the plaintiffs to enforce their
Title IX rights" under § 1983, Sea Clammers suggests that those claims
the Tenth Circuit, also in dicta,
would not be preempted. 179 However,
180
declined to find such an exception.
4. Applicability of the Abrams Concurrences to the Preemption Question
The two concurring opinions in Abrams that urge a more a careful
analysis as to whether a statutory scheme preempts an alternative remedy in
§ 1983 can be read as supporting the circuit court decisions that refuse to
find Title IX preemption of § 1983 claims. 18 1 Justice Breyer's concurrence
stressed that the TCA involved "deferential consideration of matters within
an agency's expertise."' 182 Thus, this demonstrated that Congress, in
enacting the TCA, meant "to foreclose-not to supplement-§ 1983
relief."' 1 3 Similarly, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits reasoned that the Court's
reading of a private right of action into Title IX indicates that Congress did
not mean to rely solely on agency expertise but rather presumed that
enforcement of Title IX could be left in the hands of private attorney
84

generals.1

Justice Stevens's concurring opinion emphasized that legislative history
is essential to determine the coextensiveness of a federal statute and
a procedural due process claim and no state action to support a substantive due process
claim. Id. at 1234-36.
176. Id. at 1233-34. However, the Seamons court failed to apply the Smith "virtually
identical" test, and thus did not separately analyze each of the plaintiff's constitutional
claims. See id.at 1233.
177. Id. at 1233-34.
178. Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997).
179. Lillard, 76 F.3d at 723.
180. See Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1234 n.8; see also infra notes 209-10 and accompanying
text.
181. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1462-63 (2005)
concurring).
(Breyer, J.,
concurring); id. at 1463 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
182. Id.at 1463 (Breyer, J.,
183. Id.
184. See Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that "the
[Cannon] Court has indicated that the sole express enforcement mechanism contained in
Title IX is not exclusive); Lillard, 76 F.3d at 723 (noting that the Cannon "Court concluded
that implying a private right of action would.., complement... the public remedy
explicitly created in the statute").
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§ 1983.185 Because of the "streamlined and expedited" enforcement
scheme under the TCA, 186 Justice Stevens did not think that the TCA's
"statutory requirements can simply be mapped onto the existing structure of
§ 1983, [although] there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that
Congress would have wanted [the Court] to do so." 187 That silence was an
important choice on the part of Congress and reinforced the Court's textual
and structural reading of the TCA. 18 8 This rationale supports the Crawford
court's finding that preemption analysis should extend beyond the four
comers of Title IX's text to consider Congress's legislative history. 189 The
Crawford court determined that the history, as discussed in the Court's
decision in Cannon, does not demonstrate that Congress intended that its
termination of federal funds was the exclusive remedy for sex
190
discrimination in education.
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the Court's quickness to abandon the
usual presumption that § 1983 is available to remedy federal statutory
rights. 19 1 Justice Stevens would foreclose the remedy in only the most
exceptional cases. 192
He offered no guidance, however, for what
constitutes an "exceptional" case other than that such a statutory scheme
would be "unusually comprehensive and exclusive,"' 93 and that the TCA
was such a case because it was tailored to foster an expedited review
process. 194 Therefore, it appears that Justice Stevens's view supports the
Tenth and Eighth Circuit decisions holding that Title IX is not a
comprehensive remedial scheme because its enforcement regulations are

185. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1463 (Stevens, J., concurring). Professor John F. Manning
notes that Justice Stevens would be more likely to rely on a law's background purpose, often
reflected in its legislative history, to divine a statute's meaning given Justice Stevens's belief
that Congress is imprecise in its statutory drafting but "quite coherent in the substantive
framing of policies that serve some overarching purpose." John F. Manning, Respect for
Congress in the Law of Statutory Interpretation, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2009, 2010 (2005).
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, prefers textualism--"a philosophy that gives precedence to
a statute's semantic meaning, when clear, and eschews reliance on legislative history or
other indicia of background purpose to vary the conventional meaning of the text"-because
of his belief that Congress is precise in drafting statutes due to the compromises that are
forged to pass legislation but is "quite messy in the substantive policies it adopts." Id.
186. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1464 n.* (Stevens, J., concurring).
187. Id. Justice Stevens thought it was important that "despite the fact that awards of
damages and attorney's fees could have potentially disastrous consequences for the likely
defendants in most private actions[,] ... nowhere in the course of Congress' lengthy
deliberations is there any hint that Congress wanted damages or attorney's fees to be
available." Id. at 1465 (Stevens, J., concurring).
188. See id.
189. See Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1284.
190. See id.
191. See Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1464 (Stevens, J., concurring).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 1463-64, 1464 n.*. Justice Stevens determined the TCA's review process
was a significant departure from the right of action available under § 1983. Id. at 1464 n.*.
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not unusually elaborate or exceptional. 195 Rather, those circuits conclude
that Title IX is a general statute protecting against sex discrimination and
the use of federal funds to support sex discrimination, and such an express
remedy is insufficient to preempt § 1983 claims. 196
B. Title IX Should PrecludeRelief Under § 1983
This section outlines the arguments of courts holding that the express and
judicially created remedies under Title IX illustrate that § 1983 suits would
duplicate those remedies and evade Title IX's comprehensive remedial
scheme. Additionally, the Second and Third Circuits would find that Title
IX subsumes constitutional claims as well as statutorily based claims.
1. Looking Beyond Title IX's Express Remedies
These courts, in applying the Sea Clammers doctrine, emphasize an
analysis of Congress's purpose in enacting the statute, which the Supreme
Court determined was consistent with recognition of a private right of
action under Title IX. For example, in Bruneau v. South Kortright Central
School District,19 7 a student sued her teacher, assistant superintendent, and
school district under Title IX and § 1983 for failing to protect her from
sexual harassment by her peers. 198 The Second Circuit dismissed the
§ 1983 claim based on a violation of Title IX. 199 The court explained that
Title IX itself "establishes a complex administrative enforcement scheme to
ensure compliance with its provisions," 20 0 and the § 1983 claim
contravened the scheme. The court also reasoned that the Supreme Court
has found "that Title IX implicitly permits an individual to bring a private
cause of action," 20 1 which suggests that the plaintiff had "access to a full
panoply of remedies including equitable relief and compensatory
damages" 20 2 without § 1983 and further indicates congressional intent to
20 3
supersede a § 1983 remedy.
The Third Circuit's reasoning was similar. In Pfeiffer v. Marion Center
Area School District,20 4 the plaintiff, a pregnant teen who was dismissed
195. See Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1284; Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 (10th
Cir. 1996), affd inpart,rev'd inpart, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000); see also supra notes
152-66 and accompanying text.
196. See Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1284; Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1233-34; see also supra note
32 and accompanying text.
197. 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998).
198. Id.at 752-53.
199. Id. at 758-59.
200. Id.at 756 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)-(d) (1997)). The court pointed out that an
injured individual could file a complaint with the DOE, which would investigate the
allegations and either attempt to resolve the matter informally or terminate the institution's
federal funding pursuant to an administrative hearing. Id.
201. Id.(citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979)).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990).
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from her high school's chapter of the National Honor Society for engaging
in premarital sex, filed a complaint against her school that included a
request for injunctive relief and damages under Title IX and claims of
gender discrimination under § 1983.205 The district court held that the
plaintiffs constitutional claims were "subsumed" by Title IX and thus
barred under the Sea Clammers doctrine. 20 6 The Third Circuit agreed,
refusing to hear the § 1983 claim and finding that the Sea Clammers
doctrine had "been applied consistently in analogous cases" where the
statutory scheme in question provided an enforcement scheme
comprehensive enough to preclude relief under § 1983.207 Thus, the
plaintiff could not bypass Title IX's remedial scheme, including its
enforcement regulations and implied right of action, by bringing suit under

§

1983.208

2. Section 1983 Claims Duplicate Title IX Claims
Several circuits find that plaintiffs suing under both § 1983 and Title IX
for Title IX violations seek duplicate relief, and so the § 1983 claims ought
to be barred. Despite recognizing § 1983 claims asserting violations of the
U.S. Constitution, the Tenth Circuit held that Title IX precludes § 1983
claims for violations of Title IX. 20 9 The Tenth Circuit explained that if the
plaintiff prevailed on both claims, the relief granted would be
duplicative. 2 10 The Second 2 1 1 and Seventh 212 Circuits also adhere to this
approach.
205. Id. at 782-83.
206. Id. at 789.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir.
1993). The approach that has emerged in the Third Circuit is one where plaintiffs choose
between asserting claims under Title IX or § 1983. See DiSalvio v. Lower Merion High Sch.
Dist., 158 F. Supp. 2d 553, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that Sea Clammers bars § 1983
claims for Title IX violations and that "[i]t is equally well-settled, at least in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that a § 1983 action based on a violation of
constitutional rights would be subsumed by Title IX if the plaintiff brings a Title IX claim as
well."). In DiSalvio, the plaintiff brought a claim of sexual harassment pursuant to § 1983
for a deprivation of her right to bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, but she chose not to bring a similar claim under Title IX. Id. at 556 & n.3.
Therefore, the court found that "there was no statutory claim into which her constitutional
claim under § 1983 could be subsumed," and thus her claim was outside of preemption's
reach. Id. at 558.
209. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234 n.8 (10th Cir. 1996), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000).
210. Id. The Tenth Circuit analogized to interpretations of Title VII that do not allow
Title VII to serve as a basis for an independent remedy under § 1983 even though concurrent
application of Title VII in the same litigation does not bar a cause of action for a
constitutional violation under § 1983. Id.
211. See Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 756 (2d Cir. 1998).
212. See Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999); Waid v. Merrill
Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996). In Boulahanis and Waid, the Seventh Circuit
found such claims duplicative, as well as any equal protection claims against institutions. See
infra note 225. In Delgado, which established an exception for personal-capacity suits
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3. "Virtually Identical" Constitutional Claims Are Preempted
The Second and Third Circuits preempt § 1983 claims asserting
constitutional violations in lawsuits that concurrently allege violations of
Title IX. The Third Circuit's decision in Pfeiffer found Title IX preempted
§ 1983 claims for Fourteenth Amendment violations asserted against a
school district and its officials in both their personal and official
capacities. 2 13 In addition, the Second Circuit in Bruneau declined to find an
exception to the Sea Clammers doctrine for a constitutional equal protection
claim. 2 14 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court's holding in Smith
remained relevant despite Congress's having enacted a statute that was
designed to supersede Smith and provide a remedy under § 1983. 2 15 The
Second Circuit found that where § 1983 and Title IX claims are based on
the same factual predicate, "Title IX's enforcement scheme fully addresses
... constitutional claims." 2 16 Thus, "Title IX provides the exclusive
remedial avenue. '2 17 The Second Circuit determined that to allow the
constitutional claims would entail bypassing the statute's comprehensive
2 18
remedial scheme.
4. Partial Preemption: Separate Cause of Action for Individual Liability
Another approach holds that Title IX should not preempt § 1983 claims
based on an individual defendant's violation of the U.S. Constitution. The
Seventh Circuit has held that the preemption question concerning Title IX
turns on whether the defendants who actually committed the tortious acts
were individuals or "school officials responsible for the policy or practice
that violates Title IX. ''2 19 Although affirming that Title IX supplants claims
under § 1983 seeking to hold institutions' high-level officials liable for
sexual harassment, 2 20 Delgado v. Stegall marked a change in course for the
Seventh Circuit from a prior decision that did not distinguish between
individuals and officials. 22 1 Because the court found "no hint" in the
asserting constitutional claims against state actors whose abuse did not constitute a policy or
practice for which a state-sponsored institution could be found liable under Title IX, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed that Title IX "furnishes all the relief that is necessary to rectify the
discriminatory policies or practices of the school itself." Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668,
674 (7th Cir. 2004).
213. Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 789.
214. See Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 757-58.
215. See id. at 758 n.l (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(0 (2000)).
216. Id. at 758.

217. Id.
218. Id; see also infra note 221.
219. Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2004); see also supra note 150 and
accompanying text.
220. Delgado, 367 F.3d at 674.
221. See Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999); Waid v. Merrill
Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996). In considering "parallel" Title IX and § 1983
claims brought by a teacher against a school district's director of curriculum and school
principal that had passed her over for permanent appointment, the court found that Congress
in enacting Title IX "created a strong incentive for schools to adopt policies that protect
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"background or history of Title IX" that Congress intended to supplant
§ 1983 when "relief is sought against a teacher or other non-managerial
employee" who has sexually harassed a student, claims against individuals
under § 1983 should not be preempted. 222 The court explained that
application of the Sea Clammers doctrine risked "immuniz[ing the teacher]
from liability for his federal constitutional tort" where school officials had
no actual knowledge of the teacher's conduct. 223 The court rejected that
possibility since it risked leaving students who were sexually harassed by
their teachers with no "federal remedies for sex discrimination. '224 In so
ruling, the Seventh Circuit distinguished its prior cases-finding that Title
IX precluded relief under § 1983 and declining to distinguish between
individual and institutional liability-as limited to suits against school
225
officials.
The Seventh Circuit explained that its approach in Delgado followed the
Supreme Court's decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District.226 In Gebser, the Supreme Court stated that its decision does "not
affect any right of recovery that an individual may have against a school
district as a matter of state law or against the teacher in his individual
capacity under state law or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."227 The Eighth Circuit,
although reaching a different conclusion about preemption, similarly relied
on Gebser in Kinman v. Omaha Public School District.2 28 There, the court
upheld a plaintiffs § 1983 claim for equal protection and due process
violations against her teacher because the Gebser Court "made it clear that
that decision has no effect on an individual-capacity suit against a teacher

federal civil rights" or else lose federal funding. Waid, 91 F.3d at 862. This indicated
Congress's intent to place the burden of compliance with its mandate against sex
discrimination with institutions rather than such institutions' individual officers. Id
The
comprehensiveness of judicial remedies under Title IX suggested to the Seventh Circuit that
"Congress saw Title IX as the device for redressing any grievance arising from a violation of
federal civil rights by an educational institution." Id. at 863. After Waid, the Seventh Circuit
decided Boulahanis, 198 F.3d 633. There, male athletes complaining of sex discrimination
brought suit against Illinois State University and its officials for eliminating their sports
teams. Id. at 635. The plaintiffs asserted that the decision to eliminate their teams violated
Title IX and that various school officials violated their constitutional rights. Id. at 636. The
court found that the plaintiffs' claims against individual officials under § 1983 were
preempted by Title IX. Id. at 640. The court rejected a distinction between institutional
liability and individual liability, finding that Title IX authorizes suits against institutions, not
individuals. Id. The Boulahanis court determined that the fact that Title IX did not reach
individual liability did not make the statute less comprehensive; it only indicated Congress's
decision that suits against institutions were the best means of redress for sex discrimination.
Id. Because institutions have the burden of enforcing Title IX, and the plaintiffs had
recourse under Title IX, the Title IX claim preempted remedies under § 1983. Id.
222. Delgado, 367 F.3d at 675.
223. Id. at 674.
224. Id. at 674-75.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 674.
227. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998).
228. 171 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 1999).

3220

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

brought under... section 1983."229 A number of district courts followed
this reasoning in upholding § 1983 claims asserting constitutional violations
by state actors in their individual capacities. 2 30
5. Applicability of Abrams to Preclusion
Abrams may be read to support circuit court decisions that find Title IX
preempts § 1983 claims. Although refusing to draw a bright-line rule that
the existence of a private judicial remedy in a statute forecloses
enforcement of that statute under § 1983, the Abrams opinion certainly
supports the conclusion that the recognition of an implied private right of
action under Title IX can preclude a claim under § 1983 to vindicate Title
IX.2 3 1 In suits asserting claims under Title IX and § 1983, Abrams
indicates that the inference that the § 1983 claim would be duplicative must
be overcome by express or implicit textual indication that the statutory
remedy should not supplant § 1983 relief.232 This would support the
reasoning of the Second and Seventh Circuits, which consider Title IX's
complete remedial scheme, including its implied private right of action,
when analyzing Title IX's preclusive effect on § 1983 claims. 233
The plaintiff in Abrams never asserted constitutional claims. 23 4 The
plaintiff instead sought to enforce the TCA and obtain monetary damages
under a § 1983 claim. 2 35 Although the Abrams decision did not squarely
address the validity of § 1983 claims alleging constitutional violations,
Justice Scalia expressed concern about affording plaintiffs a "more
expansive remedy under § 1983" where a statute forecloses such
remedies. 236 As a result, Abrams can be read to foreclose a more expansive
229. Id. at 611.
230. See, e.g., Doe v. Woodridge Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 68 Bd. of Educ., No. 04 C
8250, 2005 WL 910732, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2005) (holding that the availability of a

claim under Title IX precludes suit against individuals who, in their official capacity, act
pursuant to a school policy or custom, but not against individuals who engage in
discrimination in their individual capacity); Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 127 F. Supp. 2d
333, 339-40 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (mem. decision order) (finding that Title IX does not preclude

§ 1983 actions against individuals and limiting the Second Circuit's preemption decision in
Bruneau to constitutional claims asserted against school districts); see also Schultzen v.
Woodbury Cent. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1055-56 (N.D. Iowa 2003)

(granting summary judgment for the defendant on a § 1983 claim for a Title IX violation
because individuals are not recipients of federal financial assistance, but reaching the merits
of a § 1983 claim against the individual for alleged equal protection and due process
violations because such claims are permissible).
231. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1459 (2005); see
also supra Part II.B.1-2.
232. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1459.
233. See supra Part II.B.2.
234. See Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1457.
235. Id. The plaintiff also sought attorney's fees under § 1988. Id. The CRAFAA allows
courts the discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties in civil rights
suits. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). See supra note 63 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Congress's amendment of § 1988 to incorporate prevailing parties in Title IX
suits.
236. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1458-59.
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method of enforcement, including constitutional claims, under § 1983 when
such claims assert Title IX violations. This concern about evading a
statute's remedial scheme is echoed in the Second and Third Circuit
holdings that decline to allow § 1983 claims for constitutional violations
237
where the same conduct is alleged as a Title IX violation.
The Court manifested its concern that lower courts should consider the
compatibility of Title IX and § 1983 claims when, in May 2005, the
Supreme Court vacated a Sixth Circuit decision involving the equity of a
high school's scheduling of sports. 238 Without issuing an opinion, the
Court remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration in
light of Abrams.2 39 The Sixth Circuit ruling before the Court concerned
allegations that the Michigan High School Athletic Association
("MHSAA") 24 0 discriminated on the basis of sex by making girls play in
"non-traditional" seasons, which disadvantaged female athletes in their
access to college recruiters, high-quality competitions, and other
opportunities as compared to male athletes. 24 1 The plaintiffs challenged the
MHSAA's scheduling policy under Title IX, § 1983, and Michigan state
law. 242 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment that the
243
MHSAA violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
However, the Sixth Circuit never addressed the validity of the Title IX
claim because it found the MHSAA violated the Equal Protection Clause by
using impermissible gender classifications that were not related to a
legitimate governmental interest to assign seasons to various high school
244
sports.
The Supreme Court's decision to vacate and remand that Sixth Circuit
ruling can be interpreted as a signal that the Court regards Title IX as the
only recourse available to complainants of sex discrimination in schools. In
light of Abrams, where the Court expressed concern about allowing
plaintiffs "more expansive" remedies under § 1983 than Congress intended,
§ 1983 claims for Title IX and constitutional violations arguably
circumvent Title IX's remedial scheme, which affords litigants suing
institutions for sex discrimination the option of pursuing private suits or
237. See supra Part II.B.3.

238. See Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 125 S. Ct. 1973 (2005)
(mem.).
239. Id.
240. The trial court found the Michigan High School Athletic Association ("MHSAA") to
be a state actor and subject to Title IX as an entity with controlling authority over a federally
funded program. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805,
848, 854 (W.D. Mich. 2001), affd, 377 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 1973
(2005) (mem.).
241. See Cmtys. for Equity, 377 F.3d at 513; see also Caroline Hendrie, High Court
OrdersNew Review of Michigan Title IX Case, Educ. Week, May 11, 2005, at 28.

242. See Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 807-08. The § 1983 claims were based on
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and did not assert
violations of Title IX under § 1983. Id. at 807.
243. See Cmtys. for Equity, 377 F.3d at 513.
244. See id at 512-13.
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administrative review within the parameters of Title IX. 24 5 The Seventh
Circuit echoes this concern, stating that Congress enacted Title IX as its
intended avenue of relief for redressing discrimination on the basis of sex in
24 6
educational programs.
III. RECONCILING TITLE LX AND § 1983: A FRAMEWORK FOR PREEMPTION
AND STATUTORY AMENDMENT

Congress passed Title IX to ensure that federal government funds would
not go to educational institutions guilty of discrimination, and, in turn, to
protect individuals against sex discrimination. 247 Title IX's legislative
history reflects congressional concern that discrimination in educational
programs disadvantaged women as they moved through their education and
later in their careers. 248
Title IX itself expressly provides for the
termination of federal funding for institutions that fail to comply with its
provisions. 249 The Supreme Court also has recognized an implied private
right of action under Title IX to enhance Title IX's effectiveness in
250
combating sex discrimination.
The question of whether Title IX should preempt relief under § 1983 for
sex discrimination is a persistent problem that courts have grappled with for
some time now, with inconsistent answers. The decisions in the circuit
courts that fail to address the distinction between institutional and
individual defendants when assessing Title IX's compatibility with
§ 1983251 undermine Title IX's effectiveness as an instrument against sex
discrimination. This part argues that the Seventh Circuit's approach to Title
IX preemption of § 1983 claims comports with the Supreme Court's
preemption cases, including Abrams.2 52 However, to best honor Title IX,
this Note urges Congress to amend Title IX's liability standards and, at a
minimum, to codify the Seventh Circuit's approach to individual
liability. 253
This would remedy the current conflicting statutory
interpretations of Title IX while ensuring plaintiffs receive adequate
protection against sex discrimination.

245. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. In their Supreme Court brief, the
MHSAA argued that "Congress's enactment of Title IX reflects its judgment that promoting
gender equity in education is best achieved by creating incentives for educational institutions
to work with the ... (DOE) to establish policies that will eliminate discrimination." Reply
Brief of Petitioner at 8-9, Cmtys. for Equity, 125 S. Ct. 1973 (No. 04-1021), available at
2005 WL 856035.
246. See supra note 221.
247. See supra text accompanying note 32.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
249. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
250. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 695-96 (1979).
251. See supra Part II.B. 1-3.
252. See Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2004); infra Part III.A.
253. See infra Part III.B.
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A. The Seventh CircuitArticulates an Approach Most Consistent with
PreemptionDoctrineAfter Abrams
At the outset, this Note echoes Justice Stevens's criticism that the
Abrams Court was too hasty to rebut the presumption of enforceability
under § 1983.254 In cases like Suter v. Artist M and Smith v. Robinson, the
Court emphasized that the defendant bears a heavy burden to rebut the
presumption that a statute's comprehensive remedial scheme is
incompatible with § 1983.255 Those decisions suggest that the finding of
congressional intent to preempt § 1983 claims should not be an easy
decision. This interpretation makes sense in light of the fact that the
Supreme Court has found statutory schemes sufficiently comprehensive to
256
preempt suits under § 1983 on only three occasions, including Abrams.
1. Claims Against Individuals
The preemption of state actors' constitutional torts attributable to such
defendants in their individual capacities risks moving away from the
Court's position by preempting claims that Title IX does not purport to
govern. Title LX reaches institutions, not individual defendants. 257 Thus,
no overlap exists between Title IX and § 1983 regarding individual
defendants employed by state-sponsored educational programs receiving
federal funds. 258 Preemption of § 1983 claims for constitutional torts
committed by teachers in their individual capacities would limit liability in
a way not contemplated by Title IX. This was not the result Congress
259
intended in enacting Title IX.
Justice Stevens's urging that preemption should be found only in
exceptional cases 260 accords with the historical importance of § 1983.
Congress passed § 1983 to serve as a conduit to enforce substantive rights,
not as a source of substantive rights on its own. 26 1 It is designed to ensure
that all litigants have access to the federal courts to redress deprivations of
their federal and constitutional rights. 262 Section 1983's significance is
made clear by the fact that much of this country's civil rights litigation in
federal courts involves § 1983.263 As Justice Breyer urged in his Abrams
254. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1464 (2005)

(Stevens, J., concurring).
255. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992
(1984).
256. See Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453; Smith, 468 U.S. 992; Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
257. See supra text accompanying note 18.
258. Compare supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text with supra notes 71-76 and
accompanying text.
259. See supra Part I.A. 1.
260. See Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1464 (Stevens, J., concurring).
261. See supra Part I.B.
262. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
263. See Lewis & Norman, supra note 13, at 45 (noting that § 1983 is the most important
of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts).
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concurrence, context is critical to understanding a statute's compatibility
with § 1983.264 With this principle in mind, the circumstances in which
Congress enacted Title IX informs the availability of a § 1983 remedy to
litigants for violations of their constitutional rights. 265 At the time of Title
IX's passage, § 1983 provided redress for the constitutional violations of
individual state actors. 26 6 This indicates that Congress wanted to continue
individual liability for equal protection and due process violations
concurrently with institutional liability under Title IX. Given the Gebser
Court's decision to leave open the possibility of redress against individual
harassers under state tort law or § 1983,267 extending Title IX preemption
beyond institutional defendants subject to suit under Title IX would mark a
significant departure from prior case law.
The Seventh Circuit approach more squarely serves Title IX's remedial
purpose than the approaches of other circuits that adhere to a more
expansive reading of the Court's preemption doctrine. Most notably in
Delgado is the distinction between individuals and institutions. 26 8 There,
the Seventh Circuit recognized that Title IX, interpreted in Cannon to
contain a private damages remedy, is comprehensive when wielded to
rectify the discriminatory practices of an educational institution. 269 Title
IX, however, has not been interpreted to apply to teachers who act outside
of school policy or practice. 270 The Seventh Circuit correctly found that the
application of the Sea Clammers doctrine to the constitutional torts of
individuals working for federally assisted educational institutions would
undermine the prevailing presumption at the time of Title IX's drafting:
that § 1983 would be available to redress constitutional violations that Title
271
IX does not remedy.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit notes that nothing indicates that
preemption of state actors' constitutional torts attributable to such
272
defendants in their individual capacities would further Title IX's policies.
It is indeed within Congress's power to preempt more expansive remedies
than those it has provided for in a statute. 273 But Congress must clearly
signal its decision to do so. Congress has the capacity to speak clearly on
this point and has not done so with Title IX.
264. See Abrams, 125 S. Ct. at 1462 (Breyer, J., concurring).

265. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1998) (denying
damages recovery against a school district for a teacher's harassment of a student based on
respondeat superior because the principal civil rights statutes in existence at Title IX's
enactment did not provide for damages awards).
266. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961), overruled on other grounds by
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
267. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292.
268. See Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2004).

269. Id.; see also Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999); Waid
v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1996).
270. See Delgado, 367 F.3d at 672.
271. See id at 675.
272. See id. at 674.
273. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's approach comports with the Abrams
Court's observation that any limitations in a statute are deliberate and ought
not to be evaded by an alternative § 1983 remedy. 2 74 Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit's limitation of preemption to suits involving school entities and
officials amenable to suit under § 1983, and not nonsupervisory employees
like teachers, 275 adheres to the limitations of Title IX. 276 Individual liability
under § 1983 for constitutional violations is not limited by Title IX's
express or implied remedies. 277 Preemption thus cannot reach such claims.
2. Claims Against Educational Institutions and Officials Amenable to Suit
Under § 1983
The Seventh Circuit also correctly concludes that a showing of
comprehensiveness is met for Title IX, demonstrating its incompatibility
with statutory claims asserted against school entities and officials under
§ 1983.278 In this vein, § 1983 claims based on Title IX would be
preempted because the private right of action implied in Title IX is
sufficiently comprehensive to override Title IX plaintiffs' access to § 1983.
Title IX plaintiffs' ability to seek recourse in the courts may not transform
Title IX into an "exceptional" statutory scheme that is "unusually
comprehensive and exclusive," 2 79 nor does "the availability of a private
judicial remedy ... conclusively establish[] a congressional intent to
preclude § 1983 relief. '2 80 However, the statutes the Court has deemed
incompatible with § 1983 all contained a federal judicial review
provision. 28 1 In Sea Clammers, because the environmental statutes enacted
by Congress created numerous statutory remedies, including two citizensuit provisions, the Court found Congress did not intend to preserve a right
of action under § 1983.282 Likewise, in Smith, the "'carefully tailored' local
administrative procedures followed by federal judicial review" 2 83 Congress
delineated in the EHA were inconsistent with relief under § 1983.284 And,
274. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1460 (2005).
275. See supra Part II.B.4.
276. Indeed, the Third Circuit's approach, which fails to distinguish between claims

asserted against individuals and those asserted against institutions amenable to suit under §
1983, presents a doctrinal puzzle: Although preemption should, in theory, foreclose recourse
to § 1983 as an alternative remedy to Title IX, plaintiffs in the Third Circuit choose between
pursuing claims under Title IX or § 1983, which can lead plaintiffs to forgo recourse to Title
IX in favor of suit under § 1983. See DiSalvio v. Lower Merion High Sch. Dist., 158 F.
Supp. 2d 553, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also supra note 208.
277. In contrast, § 1983 claims asserted against individuals to redress Title IX violations
would evade limitations upon Title IX's remedy because Title IX's statutory focus is
institutions. See supra Part I.A.2.
278. Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1996).
279. Abrams, 125 S.Ct. at 1464 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
280. Id.at 1459.
281. See supra Part I.B.2.
282. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20
(1981).
283. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 347 (1997).
284. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984); see also supra Part I.B.2.b.
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in Abrams, the TCA's thirty-day time frame for initiating enforcement
actions convinced the Court that such a streamlined and expedited scheme
would be fundamentally incompatible with the statute of limitations for §
285
1983 actions.
Although Title IX is a more general statute than those at issue in Sea
Clammers, Smith, and Abrams, it contains a private right of action that
Congress implicitly ratified in its amendments to the statute. 286 Title IX's
express administrative remedy-the withdrawal of federal funds for
discriminatory institutions in order to prohibit federal resources from
supporting discrimination on the basis of sex-would be insufficient to

preempt § 1983 suits. 287 However, to effectuate the right contained in the
statute and "provide individual citizens effective protection" against
289
discrimination, 2 88 the Court found a private federal remedy in Title IX.
This implied right of action has been the only viable avenue of recourse for
Title IX plaintiffs because no institution has lost its federal funds as a result
of a Title IX violation. 290 Thus, while Title IX does not restrict relief
otherwise available under § 1983, it nevertheless "adds no remedies to
those available under § 1983 '' 291 and "furnishes all the relief that is

necessary to rectify the discriminatory policies or practices of the school
29 2

itself."

The preemption of virtually identical constitutional claims asserted
against institutions or officials under

§ 1983 is a more complex issue that

Abrams addressed only indirectly. 293 In light of Abrams, the Court has
signaled that it may view Title IX as the only legal avenue for plaintiffs to
assert claims of gender-based discrimination against federal fund
recipients. 2 94 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit determined that "Congress saw
Title IX as the device for redressing any grievance arising from a violation

285. See Abrams, 125 S.Ct. at 1456.
286. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
287. The Court held in Blessing, Wilder, and Wright that administrative review alone is
insufficient to demonstrate the comprehensiveness that would foreclose relief under § 1983.
See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347-48; Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-23 (1990);
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1987).
288. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
289. See id. at 705-06.
290. See Carpenter & Acosta, supra note 29, at 24.
291. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1459 (2005).
292. Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2004); cf Samberg-Champion, supra
note 86, at 1884 (noting that the importance of recourse to § 1983 for the enforcement of
federal rights is greatest where "[§] 1983 provides remedies for primary rights that otherwise
have none"). Title IX's remedial scheme as currently enforced is problematic not because of
a lack of judicial review for individuals who experience sexual harassment but rather
because of the liability standard articulated by the Court in Gebser and Davis. See supra Part
I.A.2; see also infra Part III.B. The concern is that this standard will lead educational
institutions to "insulate themselves from knowledge about [discrimination on the basis of
sex]" and thus "claim immunity from damages liability." Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 300-01 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
293. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
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of federal civil rights by an educational institution." 29 5 Insofar as the
Seventh Circuit considered claims framed as equal
protection violations and
296
Title IX violations, its view may have support.
First, the Supreme Court has adopted an expansive reading of rights
protected by Title IX, as exemplified in the Jackson Court's holding that
retaliation against a person reporting sex discrimination was itself
discrimination on the basis of sex and prohibited by Title IX's text. 297 Such
an expansive reading accords with the view that Title IX was meant to
provide far-reaching and comprehensive protection against discrimination
in the education context. 29 8 Therefore, a claim alleging an equal protection
violation is virtually identical to Title IX's broad statutory prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex when based on the same underlying
conduct and asserted against the same parties.
In addition, the circumstances in which Congress enacted Title IX
indicate that its remedial scheme was meant to constitute a stronger and
more comprehensive measure than was constitutionally mandated in
1972.299 At that time, equal protection had been recently extended to
gender-based discrimination, with only rational basis scrutiny. 30 0 Title IX's
legislative history, in contrast, "speaks of remedying discrimination against
women in much stronger terms than the 'rational relationship' that was
constitutionally required in 1972. ' ' 301 Although plaintiffs asserting equal
protection claims do not bypass any goals of this far-reaching mandate,
such legislative history "indicates that Congress perceived [Title IX] as the
most effective vehicle" 30 2 for protecting students' constitutional guarantee
to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex. Thus, courts might
conclude that Title IX's remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to
subsume allegations of equal protection violations or retaliation claimsbecause the substantive rights involved are virtually identical to Title IX's
antidiscrimination right-but is not preemptive of independent substantive

295. Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1996).
296. In Delgado, Boulahanis, and Waid, the Seventh Circuit addressed § 1983 claims

alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Delgado, 367
F.3d at 673; Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999); Waid, 91 F.3d
at 860.
297. See supra Part I.A.2.
298. See supra Part I.A.1. As one student commentator notes, it is likely that Title IX's
drafters expected the termination of federal funds to be a powerful tool in eradicating
gender-based discrimination in educational programs. See Cherner-Ranft, supra note 70, at
1900 n.82; cf Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 705 n.38 ("Congress itself has noted
the severity of the fund-cutoff remedy and has described it as a last resort ... ").
299. See Lee, supra note 26, at 71; see also David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal
Protection, 28 Harv. J.L. & Gender 217, 245-46 (2005) (discussing doctrinal differences
between Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and concluding
that Title IX provides greater protection from sex discrimination than the Equal Protection
Clause).
300. Lee, supra note 26, at 70.
301. Id. at 71.
302. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1013 (1984).
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to bodily integrity, which
due process claims, such as violations of the30right
3
are not virtually identical to Title IX claims.
The Seventh Circuit's preemption approach is the most plausible given
the state of the law and would reconcile the Abrams Court's more
expansive view of preemption 30 4 and the views articulated by Justice
Stevens's Abrams concurrence. 30 5 To that end, the Seventh Circuit's
approach requires that courts consider, prior to a finding of preemption,
whether claims are asserted against educational entities or individuals and
to allow constitutional claims
in what capacity, and it enables courts
30 6
brought against individual tortfeasors.
B. Amending Title IX
This post-Abrams framework for preemption necessitates amending Title
IX, as Congress has done in the past in response to rulings it deemed
inconsistent with Title IX's remedial purpose. 307 Two potential avenues
exist to amend Title IX. First, Congress could alter the liability standard to
eliminate the actual knowledge and deliberate indifference requirements
articulated by the Supreme Court in Gebser and Davis.30 8 If Congress did
this, Title IX could instead embrace a constructive notice standard akin to
the standard applicable to employers faced with Title VII sexual harassment
suits. 30 9 Such an amendment would lessen the burden of proof that Title 3IX
10
plaintiffs face at trial, rendering Title IX litigation more effective.
303. See Burke, supra note 44, at 1517 (arguing that "substantive due process claims...
are not virtually identical to a Title IX violation"); Zwibelman, supra note 148, at 1473,
1479 (noting the constitutional claims that a victim of sexual harassment by a teacher could
bring under the U.S. Constitution and arguing that they are not virtually identical to rights
protected by Title IX).
304. See City of Ranchos Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1459-62 (2005).
305. See id. at 1463-64 (Stevens, J., concurring).
306. Some may view the Seventh Circuit's approach as flawed because its preemption
framework might not sufficiently restore the utility of Title IX. One student commentator
argues that preemption of constitutional claims asserted against teachers and supervisory
officials not shielded by immunity, along with Title IX's "onerous" standard of liability,
leads to the implausible result of impoverishing Title IX. See Chemer-Ranft, supra note 70,
at 1919-21; see also supra text accompanying note 12 (discussing the liability standard
under Title IX); supra note 13 (discussing liability standards under § 1983). Title IX's
remedial scheme-intended to constitute greater protection than the constitutionally
mandated rational basis scrutiny of sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection
Clause at the time of Title IX's passage-would ironically narrow, even as equal protection
has grown more robust. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text. However,
congressional amendment of Title IX's liability standards and codification of the Seventh
Circuit's exception for individual liability would address this result. See infra Part III.B.
307. See supra Part I.A.3.
308. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
3 10. It is notable that the teacher-student relationship is given less protection than the
employer-employee relationship. See Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 48, at 793-94. Title
VII provides greater relief to victims of workplace harassment since the acts of employees
are the acts of the employer, and employers are only subject to a standard of constructive
notice rather than the actual notice and deliberate indifference standards applied to the
educational context. See id.

2006]

ASSESSING THE COMPATIBILITY OF TITLE IX

3229

Because the 108th Congress attempted this approach as part of the
provisions included in the FAIRNESS Act, sponsors for such legislation
3
could easily be identified. 11
Second, Congress could amend Title IX, as it amended the EHA after the
Supreme Court's Smith decision, 3 12 to specify that Title LX does not
preempt or diminish constitutional remedies available under § 1983. At a
minimum, Congress could make clear that it has not withdrawn a § 1983
remedy for constitutional claims asserted against individuals acting under
color of state law, since there is no recourse under Title IX for such
claims. 313 This would allow constitutional claims and Title IX claims to
work together to afford protection to plaintiffs.
A legislative remedy is superior to other solutions. Looking to the
Supreme Court would likely be ineffective given the Court's current
conservative approach to civil rights litigation, especially with respect to
limiting private rights of action and weakening the presumption of statutory
enforceability under § 1983. 314 This is particularly true given the addition
3 15
of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito to the Court.
Increasing the oversight function of the OCR also would be misguided
because the OCR tends to follow circuit courts' interpretations of Title
JX. 3 16 The OCR regional offices are also not uniform in their interpretation
3 17
of Title IX's regulations.
The proposed amendment to Title IX would settle questions surrounding
the claims that can be raised in a suit for sex discrimination. This would
provide plaintiffs and defendants with clear notice of available claims along

311. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. For an analysis of interest group coalition

building in support of an amendment to Title IX's liability standards in the context of peerto-peer sexual harassment, see Klusas, supra note 41, at 111-15.
312. See supra note 122.
313. If Congress indeed intends for Title IX and § 1983 to serve as alternative
overlapping remedies for gender discrimination in the education context it could specify that
§ 1983 claims against both individuals and institutions are not preempted. It is also worth
noting that adopting the Seventh Circuit's approach to individual liability could hold state
institutions to a greater level of accountability than private institutions. This is because Title
IX could extend to both public and private institutional defendants' sex discrimination,
whereas § 1983 applies only to state actors and would not apply to individual defendants at
private institutions. Plaintiffs would have the option to sue teachers at public institutions
who are not shielded by qualified immunity under both federal and state law for their
discriminatory conduct, whereas plaintiffs might only have recourse to state tort law to sue
private teachers for such conduct. Congress might therefore legislate so as to place private
teachers on a par with public teachers in this respect.
314. See supra Part I.B.
315. There is also the risk that the judiciary might limit Title IX's remedial scheme since
the Supreme Court has refined the contours of Title IX's judicially "found" cause of action
in recent years. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998)
(5-4 decision) ("Because the private right of action under Title IX is judicially implied, we
have a measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial scheme that best comports with the
statute."); see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1504 (2005) (5-4
decision).

316. See supra note4l.
317. See Carpenter & Acosta, supra note 29, at 22.
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with reasonable means to assess litigation strategy and settlement options.
Amending Title IX also adheres to the "clear statement" principle behind
spending clause legislation. Because of the contractual nature of federal
grant-in-aid programs, states must have adequate notice of the terms
attached to acceptance of federal funds. 3 18 Therefore, clarifying the
compatibility of Title IX with § 1983 through legislative amendment will
give states notice of individual liability and their need to possibly indemnify
individuals against the increased risk of litigation. 319
CONCLUSION

Virtually all educational institutions receive some portion of funds from
the federal government. Although plausible, it would be hard to imagine
any educational institution or program choosing to forego its federal
funding in order to support sex discrimination at its institution. Victims of
sex discrimination at such institutions can look to Title IX to redress the
deprivation of their right to be free from sex discrimination. However,
because of the standard for holding institutions accountable for the
discriminatory conduct of their employees, and the competing circuit court
views on Title IX's preemption of § 1983, plaintiffs are not sufficiently
protected against discrimination by individuals in federally funded
educational programs.
Under the preemption analysis articulated in Abrams and its line of case
law, the Seventh Circuit's approach emerges as the most plausible approach
to the question of whether Title IX should preempt relief under § 1983 for
claims of sex discrimination. By allowing § 1983 to vindicate rights that
Title IX does not, namely constitutional claims against individuals, the
Seventh Circuit approach would not immunize individual tortfeasors for
their constitutional violations and would not undermine the remedial
scheme set forth in Title IX. Codifying this approach along with an
alternate liability standard in an amendment to Title IX will remedy the
conflict among the circuits and ensure plaintiffs are given meaningful
review of their sexual harassment and gender equity claims.

318. See supra note 51.
319. See Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2004).

